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The use of communication networks in digital control systems introduces stability and 
reliability concerns. Standard reliability and safety assessment methods need further 
modification to accommodate the issue in the reliability assessment of networked control 
systems. In this thesis, it is demonstrated that the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology 
(DFM) can be extended to model networked control systems. The modelling of the 
communication network influence on the performance of the control system is presented. 
The areas that can affect the reliability of the control system are identified using the 
methodology. The thesis also presents the application of the DFM to a nuclear-based 
thermochemical water splitting process for hydrogen production, the Copper-Chlorine 
(Cu-Cl) cycle. The architecture of a networked control system and configuration of 
instrumentation and control systems for the hydrogen production plant are proposed in 
the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Reliability assessment methods allow the evaluation of the reliability of systems. The 
methods provide important information on how to improve a system‟s life to reduce 
safety risks and hazardous. Several reliability assessment methods were defined and used 
over the past decades (Aldemir et al., 2007; Ebeling, 1996). With the advancement in 
technology, the existing methods were extended and new methods were adopted. The 
introduction of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems in many applications 
brought the need to further modify the existing reliability assessment methods. The 
deployment of communication networks in control systems dictates the use of dynamic 
reliability assessment methods with special features, such as time dependency and multi-
state representation (Aldemir et al., 2006).   
 
1.1 Objective of the Thesis 
The objective of the thesis is to demonstrate the extension of the Dynamic Flowgraph 
Methodology (DFM) to reliability modeling of Networked Control Systems (NCSs). This 
thesis also shows how the method is applied to model the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle 
used for hydrogen production. The modelling is performed subsequent to defining the 
configuration of I&C systems, and discussing the control flow and the architecture of the 




1.2 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter 2, a literature review is provided to present 
the findings in the area of reliability assessment of networked control systems. Chapter 3 
presents the reliability modelling of networked control systems using the dynamic 
flowgraph methodology. In Chapter 4, the application of the DFM to the modelling of 
Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle is demonstrated. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and 


















This chapter presents a review of the results found in literature in the areas of networked 
control systems and their reliability assessment. The failure and performance degradation 
of the control system can lead to process instability (Huo & Zhang, 2008). Thus, the 
reliability of the control system is an essential part of the reliability of the controlled 
process. The failure of control system components (i.e., hardware, software and 
communication networks) is discussed herein. Methods for reliability assessment and 
modelling are compared. The dynamic flowgraph methodology is introduced. Also, the 
reliability modelling of communication network and its application in control systems is 
discussed.    
 
2.1 Networked Control Systems 
Instrumentation and control systems are deployed in order to regulate a process to 
provide a safe and reliable operation. The I&C systems consist of actuators, sensors and 
controllers. One promising technique for control and monitoring of processes is via the 
use of networked control systems (Soglo & Xianhui, 2006). They are used in many 
applications such as factories, hydraulic and thermal power plants, and aerospace 
industry (Hemeida, El-Sadek, & Younies, 2004). In a NCS, control elements are 
distributed throughout the process, as opposed to centralized control technique. The 
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distributed control elements are connected by a network for the purpose of 
communication and monitoring (Kim, Ji, & Ambike, 2006; Zhang, Branicky, & Philips, 
2001). The use of a shared communication network introduces time delays in the 
transmission of messages between the control elements, which is identified as one of the 
concerns associated with this control methodology.  However, NCSs offer significant 
advantages such as enhanced flexibility, and reduced wiring and maintenance (Hespanha, 
Naghshtabrizi, & Xu, 2007; Huo & Fang, 2007). 
 
A basic schematic for the layout of a networked and Distributed Control System (DCS) is 
shown in Figure 2.1 (Al-Dabbagh & Lu, 2008). The device controllers control 
equipments and communicate with each other and with the group controller via a 
communication network. The combination of a group controller and the device 
controllers is usually referred to as a partition (Harber, Kattan, & MacBeth, 1996). Each 
partition can communicate with other partitions and with a Plant Display System (PDS), 
or a Human Machine Interface (HMI), via a communication network.  
 
The data transfer is performed using communication protocols, such as Ethernet or other 
standards (Lian, Moyne, & Tilbury, 2001). There are several types of commercially 
available networks such as ControlNet, Foundation Fieldbus, Profibus, DeviceNet, 
Ethernet, Interbus, etc.  The choice of a network protocol depends on the application 
requirement. For example, in process control applications, the communication network 
should handle real-time traffic among the control devices. In utilities networks control, 
the network should be able to perform remote monitoring and station control (Kadri, 
2006). The different types of networks are suitable for different types of transmissions 
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(Zhang et al., 2001). For example, Ethernet can hold a maximum of 1500 bytes of data in 
a single packet. Thus, it is more efficient to lump data into one packet and transmit them 
together. On the contrary, DeviceNet can hold a maximum of 8 byte of data in a single 










Figure 2.1 A Generic Architecture of a Networked and Distributed Control System 
 
2.1.1 Distribution of the Controllers 
The distribution of controllers may be performed according to two schemes (Fieguth, 
2008): physical or functional distribution. In the physical distribution scheme, the nodes 
(partitions) are spread around the system in the most optimized manner, i.e., to reduce the 
amount of wiring. As a result, cabling costs can be lowered and there would be less 
congestion in the control room area. In the functional distribution scheme, the control 
application is divided into logical chuncks assigned to different partitions.  
Device Controller 
              A 
Device Controller 
              B 
Device Controller 
              N 
Group Controller 
               
                                  Plant Display System 
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2.1.2 Advantages of Networked and Distributed Control Systems 
Networked and distributed control systems offer a number of benefits that include 
(Fieguth, 2008): 
- Easy maintenance, built-in redundancy and transfer of control. 
- High performance and high level control oriented programming languages. 
- Ability to include low level logic and minor control functions, and potential for 
reductions in plant wiring. 
  
These benefits have made the use of distributed control systems very attractive for many 
applications. The next section presents a summary of designs of networked and 
distributed control systems for aircraft and nuclear power plants applications. 
 
2.1.3 Applications of Networked and Distributed Control Systems 
The distributed control methodology, where communication network is used to connect 
the control systems, is applied in a wide range of applications. In this section, a summary 
of the control system design is provided for an aircraft arm manipulator and nuclear 
power plants. 
  
A networked and distributed control system design for a manipulator arm placed on the 
surface of a spacecraft was presented by Jia, Zhuang, Bai, Fan, & Huang (2007). The 
manipulator is composed of six joints to provide six degrees of freedom. In the design of 
the distributed control system for the manipulator, a main controller was set inside the 
spacecraft and six joint controllers were set inside the joints. The spacecraft was specified 
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to communicate with the manipulator by means of a 1394 serial data bus. The main 
controller was specified to communicate with the six joints through a RS422 serial data 
bus.  
 
The main controller was specified to be responsible for: obtaining power from the 
spacecraft, communicating with both the spacecraft and with the manipulator, supplying 
power to the manipulator, and having online trajectory planning and collision detections. 
The joint controllers were specified to be responsible for: obtaining power from the main 
controller, communicating with the main controller, and controlling and driving a 
permanent magnet synchronous motor that controls the movement of the joint. 
 
In traditional instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants, most 
connections are typically hardwired point-to-point (Kim, Lee, Park, & Kwon, 2000). 
Since they are based on analog technologies, they are slow and fragile to noise. Modern 
digital communication networks are fast and more immune to channel noise (Kim et al., 
2000). The networked and distributed control system approach is also applied in the 
control and monitoring of nuclear power plants.   
 
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has been investigating the use of DCSs for 
CANDU nuclear power plants. A DCS design was proposed for control of a CANDU 9 
power plant (Harber et al., 1996). The DCS is composed of a set of control and 
monitoring partitions. The partitions are interconnected to each other as well as to the 
PDS by a communication network. The DCS was designed to use two types of bus for 
communication: a local bus and an intra-plant bus. The plant control functions are 
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assigned to the individual partitions. The functions of the group level control were 
specified to be able to:  
- obtain inputs from several sources and drive several devices,  
- implement relatively complex logic, and 
- generate outputs which can drive actuators  
 
The functions of the device level control were specified to be able to: 
-  perform control loops that may involve a small number of inputs, 
- use setpoints or error signals computed at the group level, 
- provide a facility for direct operator override in an output loop, and 
- observe redundant analog outputs or devices. 
  
The use of a DCS for Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR) has been investigated by Brown 
& Basso (2004). In the proposed design, two dual-redundant networks are used to 
transfer information: data acquisition network and inter-partition network. The two 
networks are based on Hitachi‟s µ∑ Network-1000 architecture. The network is a 100 
Mbps, fibre optic, token ring network. A single network can support 255 nodes over a 
total distance of 100 km. However, a limit of 32 nodes per µ∑ network was 
recommended for µ∑ networks used in control functions (Brown & Basso, 2004).  
 
Several studies were performed in South Korea to propose the use of Ethernet-based 
networks for distributed digital control systems in nuclear power plants (Park, Lee, Choi, 
Shin, Kim, Lee, & Kwon, 2000; Choi, 2002; Kim et al., 2000). The design is composed 




The information network is responsible for the exchange of data or commands among 
operator interface stations and engineering interface stations. For its network, the use of a 
protocol based on TCP/IP is proposed, since the information network is treated as a non-
safety computer network and hence does not need redundancy of channels. The control 
network provides the mechanism for communication between the group controllers and 
was described as the core communication network in NPPs. This makes it extremely 
important to operate in a safe, reliable and stable manner. Among the high speed 
networks, such as Fast Ethernet, Fiber-channel, ATM and FDDI, the use of Ethernet was 
proposed because it is very cheap, easy to implement, and widely available (Kim et al., 
2000). It was argued that Ethernet is very reliable and maintainable. The field network is 
responsible for communication between field controllers for sharing Input and Output 
(I/O) data. The use of High-level Data Link Control (HDLC) as its data link layer and the 
use of RS-485 scheme which has multi-drop as a physical connection were proposed. 
 
The malfunction of the control system, especially the unavailability of communication 
mechanism, can jeopardize the stability of the process and lead to safety concerns. Thus, 
reliability assessment must be performed to identify those areas that can be major 
contributors to control system unreliability. 
 
2.2 Reliability Assessment of Instrumentation and Control Systems 
The impact of process systems failure can vary from being inconvenient with minimal 
cost to extremely significant in both economic loss and safety effects. The impact in 
safety-critical systems can be severe and may lead to catastrophic events. Reasons that 
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can cause system failure include: inadequate engineering design, equipment malfunction, 
human error and improper maintenance (Ebeling, 1996). Reliability assessment must 
therefore be performed for engineering systems to study potential threats to systems 
reliability and to find areas for improvement. In reliability engineering, attempts are made 
to investigate and measure the failure of systems in order to improve their optimal use 
(Smith, 2005). This can be achieved by increasing systems design life, and reducing the 
possibility of failure and safety risks. The malfunction of instrumentation and control 
systems can jeopardize the stability of a process and may lead to plant failure (Huo & 
Zhang, 2008). The reliability of the instrumentation and control systems is an integral 
part of the reliability of the plant. Thus, the impact of I&C systems malfunction must be 
analyzed. This supplies key information on component selection, and inspection and 
maintenance strategies determination, in order to increase systems life cycle, reduce 
plants failure frequency and improve systems safety. This section presents and compares 
the different methodologies used for modelling the reliability of systems, specifically the 
digital instrumentation and control systems in safety critical application such as nuclear 
power plants.  
 
The use of digital instrumentation and control systems offers many advantages over their 
analog counterpart. The advantages include: potential to improve process safety and 
reliability, stability and improved failure detection capability, and reduced wiring and 
easier maintenance (Hespanha et al., 2007; Huo & Fang, 2007). Because of these 
advantages and obsolescence issues with current analog systems, analog I&C systems are 
no longer considered for new designs and there is an increased desire to use digital 
systems in both safety and non-safety systems in safety-critical systems, such as nuclear 
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power plants (Fullwood, Gunther, Valente, & Azarm, 1991; Aldemir et al., 2006). Some 
specific issues that were identified to be relevant to reliability modelling of digital I&C 
systems are listed as follows (Aldemir et al., 2006): 
- Digital I&C systems use combination of software/firmware in information 
processing. 
- Digital I&C systems rely on sequential circuits. Since they have memory, their 
outputs may be a function of system history. 
- The rate of data transfer is affected by the choice of internal/external 
communication mechanisms and the communication protocol. This can affect the 
digital I&C system reliability and robustness. 
- Tasks may compete for a digital controller‟s resources. This requires coordination 
between the tasks. 
- A finer degree of communication and coordination between the controllers is 
necessary in order to coordinate multiple digital controllers directly and explicitly.  
- A digital controller can remain active and not only react to data, but can anticipate 
the state of the system. 
- Tight coupling and less tolerance to variations in operation increases the digital 
I&C system sensitivity to the dynamics of the controlled physical process.  
 
However, in spite of the progress over the past few decades in studying the reliability of 






2.2.1 Methods of Reliability Modelling and Assessment 
There exist several methods that can be used to model and assess the reliability of 
systems. The choice of the method depends on the several modelling requirements. The 
most commonly used methods are: 
- Fault trees  and event trees  
- Markov models 
- Petri nets 
 
Current Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) analytical tools that assess the safety of 
safety-critical systems typically involve fault tree analysis, often in combination with 
other methods such as event trees, Markov models and reliability block diagrams (Dugan, 
Bavuso, & Boyd, 1993; Bucci, Kirschenbaum, Mangan, Aldemir, Smith, & Wood, 2008). 
The increased use of digital I&C systems raises several concerns about the capability of 
the current PSA tools to account for the dynamic interactions between the digital control 
system elements and the controlled process. For example, software failures, time 
dependency of unavailability and incomplete independence of various systems (Lu & 
Jiang, 2004). Therefore, the models of digital systems must be able to interface with the 
current PSA tools (Kirschenbaum et al., 2006), which dictates the finding of methods to 
address digital I&C systems‟ reliability in combination with the current PSA tools.  
 
2.2.2 Requirements of Reliability Modelling  
The modelling methodology is chosen based on specified requirements. The requirements 
specified for modelling digital instrumentation and control systems are listed as follows 
(Aldemir et al., 2006): 
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1. The model must be able to predict encountered and future failures well. 
2. The model must account for the relevant features of the system. 
3. The model must make valid and plausible assumptions. 
4. The model must quantitatively be able to accurately represent dependencies 
between failure events. 
5. The model must be designed so its concepts are easy to implement and learn. 
6. The data used in the quantification process must be credible to a significant 
portion of the technical community. 
7. The model must be able to differentiate between a state that fails one or multiple 
safety checks. 
8. The model must be able to differentiate between faults that cause function failures 
and intermittent failures. 
9. The model must be able to provide relevant information to users, including cut 
sets, probabilities of failure and uncertainties associated with the results. 
10. The methodology must be able to model the interaction of the digital I&C system 
portions of accident scenarios with non-digital I&C system portions of the 
scenarios. 








2.2.3 Comparison of Modelling Methods 
Table 2.1 provides details on the satisfaction of the requirements mentioned above when 
applying some of the methods for reliability modelling of digital instrumentation and 
control systems (Aldemir et al., 2006).  
 
Table 2.1 Reliability Modelling Methodologies and Requirements 
 
Requirement/Methodology 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Continuous Event Trees X X X X O ? ? X ? ? O 
Dynamic Event Trees X X X ? X ? ? ? X X O 
Markov Models X X X X O ? X X X X O 
Petri Nets X X X X O ? ? ? X X O 
Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology X X X ? X ? ? ? X X X 
Dynamic Fault Trees X ? ? ? X ? X ? X ? X 
Event Sequence Diagram X X X X O ? ? ? X X O 
 
 
In the table, the entry „X‟ indicates that the method fulfills the requirement, „O‟ indicates 
that the method does not fulfill the requirement, and „?‟ indicates that further study is 
needed to determine whether or not the method fulfills the requirement. As can be noted, 
no single method satisfies all requirements. Each method is associated with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. The methods that rank as top three with most positive 
features and least negative or uncertain features are the dynamic flowgraph methodology, 
dynamic event tree approach or Markov approach and event sequence diagram (Aldemir 
et al., 2006).  
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Although fault trees and reliability blocks diagrams are the easiest and most often used 
techniques in complex systems reliability assessment. These techniques are Boolean 
models and thus their aim is to show how a binary system (i.e., with two states) state 
depends on the binary states of the systems‟ components. In addition, those methods 
assume components independence and hence they are not suited to modelling systems in 
which there are dependencies between components (Ghostine, Thiriet, Aubry, & Robert, 
2008). As many researchers have refined the static techniques for use in various 
industries, including aerospace, medical, and nuclear, efforts must be made to modify the 
dynamic techniques for integration in the current probabilistic safety assessment tools.  
 
2.2.4 Reliability of Networked Control Systems 
Networked control systems are defined as a control system whose sensors, controllers 
and actuators are connected via means of communication networks (Wu, Deng, & Gao, 
2005; Cloosterman, Van de Wouw, Heemels, & Nijmeijer, 2006). Figure 2.2 illustrates a 
simple networked control system that consists of a sensor, controller and actuator. The 
operation of the networked control system is given as follows (Lian, Moyne, & Tilbury, 
2002): the sensor node periodically samples a process parameter with a specified 
sampling time, or sampling rate, and converts the physical parameter to a digital message. 
It then packs and send the message to controller through a shared communication 
network. The controller node unpacks the message from sensor node and employs a 
control algorithm to calculate a control signal. The signal is then sent to the actuator node 
through the communication network. The actuator then performs its task according to the 
16 
 
received control signal. This section provides a literature review of the work conducted to 




Figure 2.2 A Networked Control System 
 
The main requirement for control systems is to obtain a sufficient level of Quality of 
Control (QoC) (Galdun, Takac, Lingus, Thiriet, & Sarnovsky, 2008). To guarantee a 
sufficient reliability level of the control system, a suitable control structure needs to be 
used to meet the requirements for better dependability parameters (Galdun et al., 2008). 
Dependability involves the following concepts (Zagar, 2005): 
- Reliability: the solution must perform its specified task whenever requested. 
- Availability: the solution must be available all the time for performing the task. 
- Security: malicious third parties must not be able to take control of the solution 








Control systems are usually designed to be reliable and available under normal operating 
conditions. However, under unpredictable environmental influence (e.g., hardware 
failures, broken communication networks links), the reliability and availability may be 
affected (Zagar, 2005). Also, degradation in communication networks performance can 
affect the reliability of control systems.  
 
Failure scenarios in networked and distributed control systems can be classified by 
(Zagar, 2005): 
- A communication failure can be the cause of communication link‟s 
unavailability or degradation in communication network performance. It can 
occur at the control or field network levels. In either case, the control systems will 
be isolated, which may lead to process instability. 
- A node crash can be the cause of the failure of hardware or software of sensor, 
actuator or controller. 
 
2.2.4.1 Reliability of Communication Networks 
This subsection presents details on the reliability of computer and communication 
networks. Several studies were conducted in the area of computer networks to investigate 
their reliability (Chiou & Li, 1986; Le & Li, 1989; Jian & Shaoping, 2006).  The previous 
research conducted on network reliability has focused on models in which each 
component may be in one of two modes: operative or failed. However, a component may 
undergo degradations in performance before a complete outage and will therefore operate 
in more than two modes (Chiou & Li, 1986). Network components can be lying between 
the fully operative mode and the fully failed mode. For example, a digital transmission 
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link could have a high bit-error rate, erroneous data packets and a reduced effective 
capacity (Le & Li, 1989).  
 
The reliability of a computer network is related not only with the reliability of the 
components and the topology of the network, but also with the configurations of the 
nodes and the traffic flowing into the network (Jian & Shaoping, 2006). Nodes consist of 
two failure modes: congestive failure and failure related with inactivation of the software 
and hardware. The latter is defined as the fixed reliability of the node. The study models 
the fixed reliability by Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN). When studying the 
reliability of communication networks in networked control systems, several issues must 
be accounted for in the reliability modelling as will be discussed in the following 
subsection. 
 
2.2.4.2 Reliability of Communication Networks in Networked Control Systems 
The issues that may affect the performance of a communication network and thus 
influence the reliability of the NCS include (Galdun et al., 2008): 
- Time delay or latency: they are defined as the time from the source sending a data 
packet to the destination receiving it. There is no guarantee for zero or even 
constant delay in the sending of messages between control devices (Hespanha et 
al., 2007). The delay can affect the accuracy of time-dependent computations in 
the control system. 
- Data losses: when there is congestion in the communication network bus, some 
packets are dropped. In this case, the controllers have to make decisions with 
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incomplete information. It is assumed that messages can be lost if one of these 
conditions is satisfied: (i) the maximum number of retransmission for the message 
is reached, (ii) a new message of the same type is ready to be sent (Ghostine et al., 
2008). 
- Electromagnetic inferences (EMI): they can generate transient faults in electronic 
circuits that affect the normal operations. The component affected will be 
temporary unavailable. For example, if a communication network is affected by a 
transient fault, it may be unable to transmit data for a certain interval of time. 
External interferences occur stochastically in time which leads to variable delays 
on affected messages (Ghostine et al., 2008). 
 
In real time systems, particularly control systems, delays or dropped packets may degrade 
control system‟s Quality of Performance (QoP), which may cause instability and lead to 
catastrophic events (Ghostine et al., 2008; Huo & Zhang, 2008; Kumar, Verma, & 
Srividya, 2009). In addition, research was performed in the area of stability analysis of 
communication networks with communication limitation, focusing on the delay and 
packet dropout components (Cloosterman et al., 2006; Zhang, Zheng, & Lu, 2006; 
Zhang, Zhong, & Wei, 2008; Tian & Levy, 2008). The use of a shared communication 
network introduces different forms of time delay uncertainty between sensors, actuators, 
and controllers. The time delay (i.e., time from the source sending a message to the 
destination receiving it) comes from the time sharing of communication medium and 
other functionality required for physical signal coding and communication processing 
(Lian et al., 2002). The characteristics of time delays could be constant, bounded, or even 
random, depending on the chosen network protocols and hardware. The time delay could 
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potentially degrade a system‟s performance and possibly cause system instability (Lian et 
al., 2002). Another issue is that process information may be transmitted using multiple 
network packets, due to bandwidth and packet size constraints in some networks types. 
Therefore, chances are all, part or even none of the packets could arrive by the time of 
control calculation (Zhang et al., 2001). For real-time feedback control data (e.g., sensor 
measurements and calculated control signals), it may be advantageous to discard an old, 
untransmitted message and transmit a new packet if it becomes available. This allows the 
controller to constantly receive fresh data for control calculations (Zhang et al., 2001). 
 
The computational and operational schemes of sensors, controllers and actuators in a 
networked control system can be specified as (Zhang et al., 2001): 
- Clock-driven sensors: the sensor periodically samples a parameter in the process 
at a given sampling rate 
- Event-driven controllers: the controller calculates the control signal as soon as the 
sensor data arrives 
- Event-driven actuators: the actuator changes the plant inputs as soon as the data 
become available 
 
A performance chart was provided to compare the control performance of continuous 
control, digital control and networked control systems with sampling rates as presented in 
Figure 2.3 (Lian et al., 2002). It can be used as a guide to determine the appropriate 






Figure 2.3 Control Performance vs. Sampling Rate for Different Control Schemes (Lian 
et al., 2002) 
 
The worst, unacceptable, acceptable, and best regions can be defined based on the 
specifications of the control system such as steady-state error, overshoot and phase 
margin (Lian et al., 2002). For the networked control case, point B can be determined by 
analyzing the characteristics and statistics of network-induced delays and device 
processing time delays. As the sampling rate gets smaller, the network traffic load 
becomes heavier. The likelihood of more contention time or data loss increases in a 
bandwidth-limited network and hence longer time delays result. This condition causes the 
existence of point C in an NCS (Lian et al., 2002).  
 
The important time delays that should be considered in networked control system 
analysis are the sensor to controller and controller to actuator end-to-end delays. In an 
NCS, the time delay can be broken into two parts (Lian et al., 2002): device delay and 
network delay. The device delay includes the time delays at the source and destination 
nodes. The time delay at the source includes the preprocessing time and the waiting time. 
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The time delay at the destination node is the postprocessing time. The network time delay 
includes the total transmission time of a message and the propagation delay of the 
network. The timing behaviour of message transmission from source node to a 
destination node is shown in Figure 2.4.  
 
The preprocessing time at the source node, Tpre is the time needed to acquire data from 
the external environment and encode it into the appropriate network data format. This 
time depends on the device software and hardware characteristics. In many cases, it may 




Figure 2.4 Timing Diagram of Message Transmission (Lian et al., 2002) 
 
A message may spend time waiting in the queue at the sender‟s buffer before 
transmitting. It could be blocked by other messages on the network. Depending on the 
traffic on the network and the amount of data the source node needs to transmit, the 
waiting time, Twait may be significant. For example, if Slave 1 in Figure 2.5 is 






Figure 2.5 Waiting Time for Nodes on a Network Bus (Lian et al., 2002) 
 
The Transmission time, Ttx is the most deterministic parameter in a network system. It 
depends on the network protocol (i.e., data rate and message size) and the distance 
between the two nodes. The postprocessing time, Tpost at the destination node is the time 
taken to decode the data into the physical data format and output to the external 
environment.  
 
Due to the interaction of the network and control requirements, the selection of the best 
sampling rate is a compromise. Based on the previous analyzes, smaller sampling rates 
guarantee a better control QoP. However, in a bandwidth-limited control network, the use 
of smaller sampling rates introduces high-frequency communication which may degrade 
the network QoS. The degradation of network QoS could further deteriorate the control 








2.2.5 Reliability Modelling of Networked Control Systems 
This subsection describes related studies that model the networked control systems for 
reliability analysis. The limitations of the studies are discussed and the requirements for a 
modelling framework are defined.  
 
2.2.5.1 Previous Studies on Modelling of Networked Control Systems 
Some studies have investigated reliability and safety models of networked control 
systems (Campelo, Yuste, Rodriguez, Gil, & Serrano, 1999; Ghostine et al., 2008). In 
performing the reliability modelling, Stochastic Activity Networks (SAN) and the 
UltraSAN tool were used (Campelo et al., 1999). SAN are extensions to timed Petri nets.   
 
This technique provided the capability of using two types of activities, timed and 
instantaneous activities. Timed activities represent delays by a probabilistic distribution. 
Instantaneous activities are used if the time to complete an operation is insignificant. A 
communication network model was included in their study, as shown in Figure 2.6.  
 
Activities represent an exponentially distributed variable with a rate equal to the expected 
failure rate of the corresponding component. In this model, there are four activities 
modelling the network‟s behaviour.  
 
Activities “fnsr_1” and “fnsr_2” have a rate of: , where: 
-  is the network failure rate. 
-  is the probability of the failure being permanent. 
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-  is the network error coverage (i.e., the probability of the error being covered 




Figure 2.6 Communication Network Model (Campelo et al., 1999) 
 
 
All non-permanent uncovered network errors will take the system to the “fail_not_safe” 
state. Activities “fsr_1” and “fsr_2” have a rate of: . This means that all permanent 
network errors will be detected and if the system is unable to reconfigure itself (if there 
are no spare networks left), it will go to “fail_safe” state. Input gates are in charge of 
deciding when activities are enabled and what to do upon completion of the activity 
(Campelo et al., 1999). 
 
The network modeling is based on communication networks being available or 
unavailable. It does not include the performance degradation factors such as network 
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induced delays. The input gate predicate in the model is a Boolean expression. This 
technique does not allow the representation of multi-state systems in the model. 
 
Another study investigated the influence of the transmission faults on the reliability of a 
networked control system (Ghostine et al., 2008). Their approach is composed of two 
parts: a modelling part in which all the basic components of a networked control system 
are modelled and a simulation part in which simulation is done on the models to evaluate 
the reliability. In their work, Petri nets extensions are used. The network model is defined 
as the central model, where all other models are linked to it by sharing places. The model 
takes account of CSMA/AMP strategy used in CAN-based communication network and 
aims at evaluating some performance parameters on the network for a running time. The 
parameters include:  
- The sum and the average time delays for each node on the network. 
- The efficiency of the network. 
- Network utilization. 
- The ratio of lost messages for each node on the network. 
 
This study only takes into account CAN-based networks and is not generic. Hence, it 
cannot be used for modelling the behaviour of other networks. Although attempts were 
made to study the reliability of networked control systems, there exist many areas that 






2.2.5.2 Requirements for Reliability Modelling of Networked Control Systems 
A modelling framework for assessing the reliability of networked control systems must 
be established. The following features must be provided by the modelling technique: 
1. The model must capture the behaviour of the hardware, software and 
communication systems of the networked control system. 
2. The model must be generic. (e.g., it can be applied to model different types of 
communication networks). 
3. The model must take into account the degradation in systems‟ performance.   
4. The model must incorporate time dependency and multi-state behaviour. 
5. The model must be easy to learn, adopt and incorporate into existing PSA tools. 
 
Several studies were conducted to model the reliability of software-driven control 
systems using dynamic flowgraph methodology (Garret, Guarro, & Apostolakis, 1993; 
Yau, Guarro, & Apostolakis, 1995; Garrett, Guarro, & Apostolakis, 1995; Cosgrove, 
Guarro, & Romanski, 1996; Guarro, Yau, & Motamed, 1996; Guarro & Yau, 1996; 
Houtermans, Apostolakis, Brombacher, & Karydas, 2000; Garrett & Apostolakis, 2002). 
This methodology offers the advantage of having one model that can be used to derive 
many failure or success scenarios. In addition, the modelling technique can account for 
time dependency and multi-state representation of systems‟ parameters. These two 
important features in modelling the reliability of digital I&C systems are not provided by 
traditional fault tree analysis. Further details on the dynamic flowgraph methodology and 




2.3 The Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology 
The dynamic flowgraph methodology is a digraph (directed graph) based approach to 
model and analyze the behaviour and interaction of software and hardware within an 
embedded system for the purpose of safety and reliability assessment and verification 
(Garret et al., 1993; Garrett et al., 1995; Yau et al., 1995; Cosgrove et al., 1996; Guarro et 
al., 1996; Guarro & Yau, 1996; Houtermans et al., 2000; Garrett & Apostolakis, 2002). 
The dynamic flowgraph methodology has been mainly applied in modelling software 
driven control systems. It was also presented as an approach to model an operating team, 
where the performance of individuals in the team and their interaction with the system 
hardware was modeled (Milici, Wu, & Apostolakis, 1996). In the DFM approach, system 
models are developed in terms of causal relationships between physical variables and 
temporal characteristics of the execution of software modules. The DFM model can also 
capture time dependent behaviour and switching logic. When modelling a digital control 
system, both the controlling software and the system being controlled can be represented 
in the DFM model (Guarro & Yau, 1996). The methodology has two fundamental goals 
(Guarro & Yau, 1994): 
- To provide an integrated hardware/software  model of the system 
- To identify how certain critical events of interest may occur 
 
Although DFM is based on digraphs, it shares more similarities with the state machine 
approach (Garret & Apostolakis, 2002). Instead of using static models with continuous 
partial derivates to model the relationships between process variables, the system state is 
dynamic and state transitions are expressed using decisions tables.  The difference is that 
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DFM also models the system hardware (including failure behaviour) and operating 
environment in addition to software (Garret & Apostolakis, 2002). 
 
2.3.1 Model Components 
The DFM uses a set of basic modeling elements to represent the system parameters and 
their relationships as described below and shown in Figure 2.7.  
1. Process variable and conditioning nodes, 
2. Causality and conditioning edges, and 







Figure 2.7 DFM Modelling Elements 
 
2.3.2 Model Construction 
The modelling strategy is a two step process: construction of a model and analysis of the 
constructed DFM model. 
 








The construction of DFM models is performed using a detailed multi-state representation 
of the cause-and-effect and time-varying relationships that exist between key system 
parameters. The nodes represent the systems‟ parameters, components or variables. They 
are discretized into a finite number of states and therefore represent more than just an 
operative or failed scenario. For example, a node can represent a range of operating 
pressure reading. The process variable nodes are used to represent physical or software 
parameters. The condition nodes are used to identify component failure states, software 
switching actions and changes of process operation modes (Guarro et al., 1996). The 
edges are used to visually represent the type of relationships that exists between 
parameters (i.e., cause-and-effect or conditioning relationship). Transition boxes and 
transfer boxes are used to express the detailed representation of the function and temporal 
relationships that exist among parameters states. Transition boxes differ from transfer 
boxes in that a time lag is assumed to occur between the time when the input variable 
states become true and the time when the output variable states are reached (Guarro et al., 
1996). The boxes contain decision tables that are used to incorporate a multi-state 
representation of the relationships that exist among the parameters. Decision tables are a 
mapping between possible combinations of the input states and output process variable 
nodes (Guarro et al., 1996). They can be implemented from empirical knowledge of the 
system, physical equations that describe the behaviour of the system, or software code 
and/or pseudo code (Cosgrove et al., 1996).  
 
A model is always a compromise between faithfulness and simplicity. A model can be 
very detailed to represent all the system behaviour and dynamics, yet at the same time, 
can be intractable. Thus, assumptions should be made to simplify the model, while 
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leaving it relatively faithful and tractable (Ghostine et al., 2008). In other words, careful 
selection of the number of states should be made while maintaining sufficient amount of 
information in order to capture more details of the behaviour of the system (Guarro et al., 
1996).  
 
2.3.3 Model Analysis 
The second step involves the analysis of the constructed model. This allows for 
identification of the modes by which specific system and process failure states can take 
place. An implemented DFM model can be analyzed by tracing sequences of events 
inductively and/or deductively through the model structure. This identifies the paths by 
which combinations of basic events can propagate through the system to result in system 
events of interest, whether desirable or undesirable. The DFM Software Toolset allows 
for performing the deductive and inductive analysis of an implemented DFM model. 
 
The inductive DFM analysis follows a bottom-up approach. It is performed by specifying 
a set of component states and then investigating the propagation through the system and 
finding the influence on the system state level of interest. The deductive DFM analysis 
follows a top-down approach. It is performed by specifying a state of interest and finding 
the combination and sequences of parameters that lead to the specified state. When 
performing deductive analysis, timed prime implicants can be found. A prime implicant 
is defined as a conjunction of primary events which are sufficient to cause the top event 
and which does not contain any shorter conjunction of the same events which is also 
sufficient to cause the top event (Cosgrove et al., 1996). Prime implicants can be helpful 
in identifying unknown systems hazards, prioritize the disposition of known systems 
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hazards, and guide lower-level design decisions to eliminate or mitigate known hazards 
(Garrett & Apostolakis, 2002). In addition, timed fault trees can be derived for any top 
event to visually represent the combination and sequences of events that lead to the 
occurrence of the specified top event. In the inductive and deductive DFM analysis, the 
model is analyzed by automated forward- and back-tracking procedures, respectively. 
The analysis can be continued for several steps forward or backward in time. The 
information associated with each step is presented in the form of intermediate transition 
tables. Transition tables are logically equivalent to gates in a time-dependent fault tree. 
    
The deductive DFM analysis shares key conceptual features with traditional fault tree 
analysis. However, DFM uses a multi-state and time dependent representation of system 
and parameter conditions. In addition, timed fault trees, derived using DFM deductive 
analysis, systematically and formally account for the timing relations between system and 
parameter states (Garrett et al., 1995). DFM is reported to offer major advantages over 
conventional safety and reliability methods. It represents the capabilities of FMEA, FTA 
and HAZOP in one tool (Houtermans et al., 2000). Only one DFM model is needed to 
capture the complete behaviour of a system. A model can be used for performing failure 
analysis, verifying design requirements and defining test cases. In addition, a model 
provides the capability of executing the equivalent of a large number of fault tree 
derivations for different possible top events of interest. Thus, it is not necessary to 
perform separate model constructions for each system‟s state of interest (Garrett et al., 
1993). The DFM approach provides a documented model of the system behaviour and 
interactions as well as a framework to model and analyze time-dependent behaviour (Yau 
et al., 1995).  
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2.4 Chapter Summary 
The chapter provided literature review of networked control systems and their reliability 
assessment. Methods for reliability assessment of digital instrumentation and control 
systems were compared. The dynamic flowgraph methodology was introduced and the 
advantages of the method were discussed. In addition, the features that should be 
provided by reliability assessment methods were listed. The following chapter 
demonstrates the extension of the dynamic flowgraph methodology to modelling of 



















DYNAMIC FLOWGRAPH METHODOLOGY FOR MODELLING OF 
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS 
 
A major issue in reliability modelling is how to compose hardware reliability, software 
reliability and timely correctness to arrive at a reasonable system‟s reliability model 
(Nolte, Hansson, & Norstrom, 2003). Reliability modelling of systems using the dynamic 
flowgraph methodology offers many advantages over other reliability modelling methods 
(Garret et al., 1993; Garrett et al., 1995; Yau et al., 1995; Cosgrove et al., 1996; Guarro et 
al., 1996; Guarro & Yau, 1996; Houtermans et al., 2000; Garrett & Apostolakis, 2002). 
The use of DFM allows for modelling of systems as a whole. The method can be used to 
capture the behaviour and interactions of the hardware and software components of 
systems. It allows the incorporation of multistate systems and time dependency into the 
analysis. One DFM model can be used to study different events of interests. The 
modelling technique provides the following capabilities: 
- Modelling of systems‟ behaviour, and 
- Investigation of the effect of components‟ reliability 
 
This chapter demonstrates the extension of the methodology to the modelling of 
networked control systems. Figure 3.1 shows the schematic of a simple networked 
control system. The system consists of a controller, actuator and sensor that are 
connected using a communication network. The sensor periodically samples and sends 
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data to the controller. The controller‟s decision and instructions are sent to the actuator to 
take action in the process (e.g., change valve position, change motor speed, etc.). The 










Figure 3.1 A Simple Networked Control System 
 
 
3.1 Modelling of Communication Network 
This subsection demonstrates the modelling of the behaviour of the communication 
network in a NCS using the dynamic flowgraph methodology. The reliability of the 
communication network influences signals transmission between the communicating 
nodes. For example, in Figure 3.1, if communication is available, messages will be 
transmitted on time. This is modelled by allowing the controller to use the current 
transmitted message. Otherwise, if communication is unavailable, the controller will not 
receive the current value. Consequently, it will use the message transmitted from the 
previous cycle.  






From the controller point of view, if transmission is completed on time, the sensor 
measurement used by the controller is defined by Eq. 3.1. Otherwise, the sensor 
measurement used by the controller is defined by Eq. 3.2. 
(3.1) 
                        (3.2) 
where, Msc is the sensor measurement used by the controller,  is a discrete sampled 
value,  is the message at ,  is the message at  (i.e., from the 
previous cycle). From the actuator point of view, if transmission is completed on time, 
the controller instruction used by the actuator is defined by Eq. 3.3. Otherwise, the 
controller instruction used by the actuator is defined by Eq. 3.4. 
                                                                                                                  (3.3) 
                        (3.4) 
where, is the controller instruction used by the actuator,  is the message at , 
 is the message at  (i.e., from the previous cycle). The model takes into 
account the availability of the communication link and the performance degradation of 
the communication network. The communication system is seldom robust to loss of data 
or data latency (Zhang et al., 2001). Time delays are indicated to be the main source of 




As mentioned in Section 2.2.4.2, in a networked control system, time delays are broken 
into preprocessing time, , waiting time, , transmission time, , and 
postprocessing time, . The total time delay is expressed by Eq. 3.5. The time delay 
components are used in implementing the DFM model. DFM models are implemented 
for each component of the time delay as discussed below.  
                                           (3.5) 
 
3.1.1 Preprocessing Time Component 
The preprocessing time at the source node is defined as the time needed to acquire data 
from the external environment and encode it into appropriate network data format. For 
example, data is sampled and decoded into digital format. The time is the sum of the 
computation time and the encoding time. It depends on the device software and hardware 
characteristics. The model is shown in Figure 3.2, where SHSS, PRE and SD represent 
source hardware/software status, preprocessing time and source delay, respectively. The 






Figure 3.2 DFM Model of Preprocessing Time Component 
 















The source preprocessing time is assumed to be τPRE when the corresponding processor is 
functional. In case of an unavailability or failure of the hardware or software components 
of the processor, a time delay of τx is assumed. Numerical representations of the variables 
are left unassigned for the sake of generality. Table 3.3 provides the decision table for 
transfer box T1 to express the mapping between the variables. 
 
Table 3.3 Decision Table for T1 in Preprocessing Time DFM Model 
 
Input Output 
SHSS PRE SD 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
 
3.1.2 Waiting Time Component 
The waiting time, which is also referred to as network access time, is defined as the time 
a message may spend in the queue at the sender‟s buffer before transmission. The waiting 
time is the sum of the queue time and the blocking time. The time depends on the amount 
of data the source node must send and the traffic on the network. The main factors 
affecting waiting time are network protocol, message contention type and network traffic 
load. The model of this component is included in the next subsection. The waiting time is 
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discretized into two ranges, an acceptable range, 0 - τWAIT1 and an unacceptable range, 
τWAIT1 - τWAIT2. Table 3.4 describes the discretization of the variable, where WAIT 
represents the waiting time.  
Table 3.4 Discretization of Waiting Time (WAIT) 
 
0 0 - τWAIT1  
1 τWAIT1 - τWAIT2 
 
 
3.1.3 Transmission Time Component 
The transmission time is the time required to transmit a message between two nodes. The 
formula for transmission time is described as shown in Eq. 3.6 (Lian et al., 2002).  
                                  (3.6) 
where,  is the message size in terms of bits,  is the bit time and  is the 
propagation time between any two devices. The propagation time is negligible in a small 
scale control network (100 m or shorter) since typical transmission speed in a 
communication medium is 2 x 10
8
 m/s (Lian et al., 2002).  
 
The DFM model of the transmission time and waiting time components is shown in 
Figure 3.3. Tables 3.5 – 3.6 demonstrate the discretization of the variables that represent 









Figure 3.3 DFM Model of Transmission Time and Waiting Time Components 
 
Table 3.5 Discretization of Bit Time (BIT) 
 
0 0 - τBIT1  
1 τBIT1 - τBIT2 
 
Table 3.6 Discretization of Message Size (MS) 
 
0 0 – ms1 
1 ms1 – ms2 
 
 
The transmission time is discretized into three ranges as shown in Table 3.7, where TX 
represents to the transmission time variable. The discretization of the variable is given by 
Eq. 3.7 – Eq. 3.9.  
 
Table 3.7 Discretization of Transmission Time (TX) 
 
0 0 – τTX1 
1 τTX1 - τTX2 
2 τTX2 - τTX3 
 
                          (3.7) 
                        (3.8) 
                          (3.9) 
 
 
  BIT 
   MS 
   TX 
  WAIT 






where,  is the message size and  is the bit time. The ranges represent the 
required, acceptable, and unacceptable transmission times, respectively. The decision 
table for transfer box T2 is given in Table 3.8.   
 
Table 3.8 Decision Table for T2 in Transmission and Waiting Time DFM Model 
 
Input Output 
BIT MS TX 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 1 2 
 
The network delay is the sum of the transmission delay and the waiting time. The 
discretization of the network delay and network availability is shown in Tables 3.9 – 
3.10, where NTD and NTA represent the network time delay and network availability, 
respectively. The discretization is given according to Eq. 3.10 – Eq. 3.12. Table 3.11 
provides the decision table for transfer box T3. 
 
Table 3.9 Discretization of Network Time Delay (NTD) 
 
0 0 - τNTD1  
1 τNTD1 - τNTD2 
2 τNTD2 - τNTD3 
 
 







                     (3.10) 
          (3.11) 
          (3.12) 
 
Table 3.11 Decision Table for T3 in Network Time Delay DFM Model 
Input Output 
NTA TX WAIT NTD 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 
- - 1 2 
- 2 - 2 
1 - - 2 
 
 
3.1.4 Postprocessing Time Component 
The postprocessing time at the destination node is defined as the time taken to decode the 
network data into the physical data format and output to external environment. It is the 
sum of the decoding time and the computation time. The DFM model of this component 
is shown in Figure 3.4. The discretization of the variables is given in Table 3.12 – 3.13, 
where DHSS, POST, and DD represent the destination hardware/software status, the post 
processing time and the destination delay, respectively. The device delay at the 
destination node is assumed to be τPOST when the corresponding processor is functional. 
In case of an unavailability or failure of the hardware or software components of the 
processor, a time delay of τy is assumed. The decision table for transfer box T4 is 








Figure 3.4 DFM Model of Postprocessing Time Component 
 








Table 3.14 Decision Table for T4 in Destination Delay DFM Model 
Input Output 
DHSS POST DD 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
 
 
The DFM models of the time delays are combined to form the DFM model of the 
communication network effect, as shown in Figure 3.5. In the model, the total device 
delay, represented by DVD, is the sum of the delays at the source node and the 
destination node. This is expressed in Eq. 3.13. The discretization of the total device 
delay is given in Table 3.15 and the decision table for transfer box T5 is given in Table 
3.16. 
             (3.13) 















Figure 3.5 DFM Model of Communication Network 
 




Table 3.16 Decision Table for T5 in Communication Network DFM Model 
Input Output 
SD DD DVD 
0 0 0 
1 - 1 
- 1 1 
1 1 1 
 
The total time delay is expressed in terms of the total device delay and the network delay. 
The discretization of the total time delay, represented as DEL in the DFM model, is given 
 POST    DD 
DHSS 
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in Table 3.17. The decision table for transfer box T6 is given in Table 3.18. The total 
time delay is calculated according to Eq. 3.14 – Eq. 3.16.  
 
Table 3.17 Discretization of Total Delay (DEL)  
0 0 - τDEL1  
1 τDEL1 - τDEL2 
2 τDEL2 - τDEL3 
 
Table 3.18 Decision Table for T6 in Communication Network DFM Model 
Input Output 
DVD NTD DEL 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
- 2 2 
1 - 2 
 
                                                (3.14) 
                                        (3.15) 
                                         (3.16) 
 
The equations represent required, accepted and unaccepted time delays, respectively. The 
total delay is compared to a threshold (i.e., sampling rate) to determine whether the 
communication between the nodes is affected. The discretization of the node CN that 
represent the communication network effect is shown in Tables 3.19. The decision table 




Table 3.19 Discretization of Communication Network Effect (CN) 
0 will affect performance 
1 will not affect performance 
 








The implemented DFM model can study the reliability of different types of 
communication networks. The aim of this study is to implement a generic model. When a 
network type is determined, the message transmission rate, message size, etc. can be used 
as inputs to the model. Based on knowledge about the system, specifications can be 
determined (e.g., sampling time requirement, etc.). The model also incorporates multi-
state representation of components behaviour. For example, the node „DEL‟ is discretized 
into 3 states that represent different ranges of delays. These features make this 
methodology much more powerful than other reliability assessment tools. 
 
3.2 Networked Control System Example  
Figure 3.6 shows a simple process. The main components of the process are the main 
stream pipe, the flow pipe, the flow sensor, the control valve, the controller and 













Figure 3.6 A Simple Process System 
 
 
- Pipes: the diameter of the pipes is 10 cm. The length of both the main stream pipe, 
MF and the flow pipe, F is 1 m. 
- Sensor: the sensor periodically samples and sends data to the controller. The 
sampling rate is 100 ms.  
- Valve: the control valve is driven based. The valve can be throttled from 5% 
opened all the way to fully opened.  
- Controller: the controller‟s function is to maintain the flowrate through the flow 
pipe at 40 cm
3
/s by throttling the control valve. The controller receives flow 
measurements, FMC from the sensor, implements the control logic and then sends 
instructions, CI to the control valve. The controller compares the measured 
flowrate with the setpoint. If the values differ, the controller calculates the change 
in the valve position. If they are the same, the valve position is left unchanged. 
The change in the control valve position is determined using a Proportional-
Integral (P-I) control law. The P-I controller used in the NCS example has a 




MATLAB/Simulink is used to implement a computer model that simulates the process. 
The computer model is used subsequently to demonstrate the applicability of the DFM 




Figure 3.7 Simulink Model of the NCS Example 
 
In the model, the flow in the main stream (before the valve) is initially set at 55 cm
3
/sec. 
At time t = 30 seconds, the flow increases gradually until it reaches 75 cm
3
/sec at time t = 
32 seconds. The P-I controller attempts to maintain the flow rate at 40 cm
3
/sec (after the 
valve) by adjusting the valve position. The PID controller block was used in the Simulink 
model, where the deferential gain was set to zero and the proportional and integral gains 
were those given above. Figure 3.8 presents the sub-model used to calculate the valve 
position, which is from 5% - 100% opened.   
 
Figure 3.8 Simulink Model for Calculating the Valve Position 
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The flow in the main stream (before valve), the controlled stream (after the valve) and the 
valve position are shown in Figure 3.9. In the figure, communication delay is not 
included (i.e., time delay = 0 seconds). Between 30 and 30.3 seconds, the flow in the flow 
stream increases to reach a maximum value of 42.5 cm
3
/sec and then begins to decrease 
to meet the flow requirement.  
 
 
Figure 3.9 Flow vs. Valve Position with No Communication Delay 
 
 
The next step in the modelling of the process is to include the effect of the 
communication network. The type of the control network chosen for this example is 
ControlNet. ControlNet has a data rate of 5Mb/s, bit time of 0.2 µs and minimum 
message size of 7 bytes (56 bits) (Lian et al., 2001). The parameters assumed in the 
communication network model are those listed in Table 3.21.  
 
Table 3.21 Parameters Used in Communication Network Model 
Parameter Value 
Preprocessing time 1 µs 
Postprocessing time 1 µs 
Message size 240 bits 
Bit time 0.2 µs 
Waiting time Random 
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In this type of network, the random waiting time is bounded. The maximum waiting time 
is the Token Rotation Time (TRT), which is assumed to be 1.2 seconds. The calculation 
of the total communication delay is performed using a MATLAB routine, which is 
included in the Appendix. The calculated value is used in the Simulink model. The 
communication network effect is introduced between the flow sensor and the controller to 
represent sensor-to-controller delay. Figure 3.10 shows the block that implements this 
effect. The effect of communication delay is most evident when process variables change. 
Thus, in the Simulink model, the delay is introduced when the flow in the main stream 
starts to change at t = 30 seconds.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Simulink Model of Communication Network Effect 
 
The total time delay generated by the MATLAB routine is 0.8775 seconds. The resulting 
plots are shown in Figure 3.11. Between 30 and 30.8775 seconds, updated measurement 
data are not transmitted due to the introduced time delay and they are considered to be 
lost from the controller‟s perspective. The loss of data dictates the controller to use the 
most recent sensor measurement, which was obtained at t = 30 seconds (55 cm
3
/sec). 
Therefore, the controller maintains the position of the valve at approximately 73%. 
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At time t = 30.8775 seconds (0.8775 seconds after the insertion of the delay), the 
controller receives the actual flow in the main stream and determines the new valve 
position in order to maintain the flow at 40 cm
3
/sec. Between time t = 30 and 30.8775 
seconds, the flow increases significantly since it is not properly controlled. The flow 
increases to reach a maximum value of 51.65 cm
3
/sec and then it begins to decrease. In 
safety-critical applications, the flow increase of 9.15 cm
3
/sec (51.65 – 42.5 cm
3
/sec) may 
cause process instability and may lead to catastrophic events.  
 
Figure 3.11 Flow vs. Valve Position with Communication Delay 
 
In applying DFM to the networked control system example presented in Figure 3.6, 
assumptions similar to those used by Guarro et al. (1996) were made with regard to the 
possible failure modes of system components. The flow sensor can fail high, fail low or 
fail as-is. The control valve can fail open, fail closed or fail as-is. These multistate 
representations are included in the DFM model. The DFM model of the system is 
implemented as shown in Figure 3.12. In the figure, the controller model, C and the 
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communication models, the communication between sensor and controller, CSC and 
controller and valve, CCV are represented as black boxes. The controller model is 
expanded as shown in Figure 3.13. The modelling technique of the controller is similar to 
that given by Guarro et al. (1996). The model of both communication blocks is similar to 
that discussed in the previous subsection. The description of the model variables is 
presented in Table 3.22. In Figure 3.12, transfer box 8 and transfer box 9 represent the 
control valve and the flow sensor, respectively. Transfer box 10 represents the flow 
stream pipe. Transition box 11 and transition box 12 represent sensor-to-controller and 
controller-to-actuator communication, respectively. Transfer boxes 13, 14 and 15 in 
Figure 3.13 represent the P-I logic that determines the change in the control valve 
position. 












MF Main flow stream 
F Flow 
FMP Flow measurement in previous cycle 
FSS Flow sensor status 
FM Flow measurement 
FMC Flow measurement used by the controller 
FSP Flow setpoint used by the controller 
FE Flowrate error term used by the controller  
FEP Flowrate error term in previous cycle 
IFE Integral control term for flowrate  
IFEP Integral control term for flowrate in previous cycle 
CD Controller decision  
CI Controller instruction to the valve 
DFV Change in valve opening  
FVP Valve opening in previous cycle 
FVS Valve status 
FV Valve opening 
CSC Communication between sensor and controller 










































































































Figure 3.13 DFM Model of Controller Block in NCS DFM Model 
 
The nodes in the DFM model are discretized into finite number of states. The 
discretization scheme is shown in Tables 3.23 – 3.30. The tables demonstrate the 
knowledge about the system and the assumptions regarding the failure modes of the 
components.  
 
Table 3.23 Discretization of Main Stream Flow (MF), Flow (F), Flow Measurement in 
Previous Cycle (FMP), Flow Measurement (FM) and Flow Measurement Used by 
Controller (FMC) 
 










Table 3.24 Discretization of Flow Sensor Status (FSS) 
 
0 Failed low 
1 Normal 
2 Failed high 
3 Failed as-is 
 




  IFEP 
  FSP 
 FMC 
  FEP 
14 
   FE  13 
   IFE 15 
  CI 
17 
   CD 16 
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/s to 0 
 
Table 3.27 Discretization of Integral Control Term for Flowrate (IFE) and Integral 





1 0 to 200 cm
3
/s 




Table 3.28 Discretization of Controller Decision (CD), Controller Instruction to Valve 
(CI) and Change in Valve Opening (DFV) 
 
0 Open by some percentage 
1 No change 
2 Close by some percentage 
 
Table 3.29 Discretization of Valve Opening (FV) and Valve Opening in Previous Cycle 
(FVP) 
 
0 5-40% open 
1 40-60% open 
2 60-100% open 
 
Table 3.30 Discretization of Valve Status (FVS) 
 
0 Failed open 
1 Normal 
2 Failed closed 
3 Failed as-is 
 
The mappings between the process variables are presented in the decision tables, Tables 
3.31 – 3.38. The tables were constructed based on logical and dynamical interaction 
between process parameters. In the tables, the item „-‟ indicates a „does not matter‟ entry. 
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It can be noted from Table 3.38 that the representation of the integral of flow error used 
by the controller, IFE, is not taken into making the decision for T16. This is because the 
limited number of states in both node variables, FE and IFE. Thus, a decision table for 
T15 is left unimplemented.  
 
Table 3.31 Decision Table for T8 in NCS DFM Model 
 
Input Output 
FVS DFV FVP FV 
0 - - 2 
2 - - 0 
3 - 0 0 
3 - 1 1 
3 - 2 2 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 2 
1 0 2 2 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 2 
1 2 0 0 
1 2 1 0 
1 2 2 1 
 
Table 3.32 Decision Table for T9 in NCS DFM Model 
 
Input Output 
FSS F FMP FM 
0 - - 0 
2 - - 2 
3 - 0 0 
3 - 1 1 
3 - 2 2 
1 0 - 0 
1 1 - 1 





Table 3.33 Decision Table for T10 in NCS DFM Model 
Input Output 
FV MF F 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 2 1 
1 1 0 
1 2 1 
1 0 0 
1 1 1 
1 2 2 
 





0 - 0 0 
0 - 1 1 
0 - 2 2 
1 0 - 0 
1 1 - 1 
1 2 - 2 
 





0 - 0 0 
0 - 1 1 
0 - 2 2 
1 0 - 0 
1 1 - 1 
1 2 - 2 
 
Table 3.36 Decision Table for T13 in NCS DFM Model 
Input Output 
FSP FMC FE 
0 0 2 
0 1 0 











Table 3.38 Decision Table for T16 in NCS DFM Model 
Input Output 
FE IFE CD 
0 - 1 
1 - 2 
2 - 0 
 
 
3.3 Model Analysis and Results 
The DFM Software Toolset can be used to implement and analyze the DFM model. The 
toolset allows inductive and deductive analysis. Once the DFM model is implemented in 
the toolset and nodes states and decision tables are specified, timed prime implicants can 
be obtained by analyzing the implemented model. Alternatively, a timed fault tree can be 
constructed manually to provide a visual representation of the combination of basic 
events that lead to the top event.  
 
In this section, the derivation of both the timed prime implicants and timed fault tree is 
demonstrated. The prime implicants technique is used for analysis of the communication 
network model explained in Section 3.1. The fault tree technique is used to demonstrate 




The prime implicants for the unavailability of communication between control systems, 
CN = 0 are determined using the DFM Software Toolset. There are 5 prime implicants 
that can lead to the top event, as shown in Figure 3.14. 
   
 
 
Figure 3.14 Prime Implicants of Communication Unavailability in NCS 
 
The prime implicants provided by the DFM can be used to enhance systems‟ 
performance. For example, for the NCS example given above, a delay higher than or 
equal to 100 ms is considered unacceptable. It makes the communication unreliable and 
leads to system instability. In order to reduce the delay below the unacceptable level, the 
prime implicants can be used in making decisions to modify the design of the networked 
control system. Based on Prime Implicant #1 in Figure 3.14, excessive waiting time is 
one of the factors that can affect the performance of the networked control system. The 
waiting time is dependent on the control network type and the configuration of the 
network nodes. The reduction of the waiting time can significantly enhance the 
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performance of the control system. Figure 3.15 shows the plots of the flow and the valve 
position for a waiting time of 80 ms. Between 30 and 30.3 seconds, the flow increases to 
reach a maximum value of 42.5 cm
3
/sec. This is very similar to the results obtained for 
the case where no communication delay is introduced. It can be noted in Figure 3.15 that 
the insertion of 80 ms waiting time does not affect the performance of the control system 
and the controlled process. Prime Implicant #2 suggests that the combination of large bit 
time and message size is another factor that leads to the top event. The bit time is 
dependent on the network type and cannot be changed. The message size can be varied 
by the system designer. In the example given above, the bit time is 0.2 µs and the 
message size is 240 bits, as previously listed in Table 3.21. The two parameters are 
considered small since they result in a transmission time delay of 48 µs. Thus, for this 
example, selecting a different network type or reducing the message size will not enhance 
the performance of the system. When using DeviceNet as the communication network, 
the bit time is 2 µs and the minimum message size is 47 bytes, which is equal to 376 bits 
(Lian et al., 2001). Those parameters can lead to a transmission time delay that may 
affect systems‟ performance. It is therefore recommended to pay additional attention to 
determining the message size used when deploying networks such as DeviceNet. Based 
on Prime Implicant #3, 4 and 5, the availability and functionality of the communication 
link and nodes‟ processors are severe factors that affect communication reliability. Thus, 






Figure 3.15 Flow vs. Valve Position with Reduced Communication Delay 
 
In addition, the DFM model can be used for inductive analysis. This assists in verifying 
designs and identifying potential threats to systems instability. For example, the designer 
can use the DFM Software Toolset to investigate the consequences of having the 
following basic events: waiting time in the range τWAIT1 - τWAIT2, bit time of τBIT1 - τBIT2, 
postprocessing time of τy, etc. or other combinations of events. 
 
The next step is to analyze the implemented DFM model of the NCS example. A timed 
fault tree is derived to perform the analysis. Given reliability data of basic events (e.g., 
unavailability of communication link, etc.), the reliability of the top event can be 
calculated.  Timed prime implicants can also be generated either from the implemented 
fault tree or using the DFM Software Toolset. The analysis allows the identification of 
areas of potential improvement to minimize risk and enhance safety. The timed fault tree 
for the top event „flow measurement is above 40 cm
3
/s‟ is presented here as an example. 
Fault trees can be derived for any other event of interest (e.g., flow is below 40 cm
3
/s, 
communication will affect performance, etc.). In order to derive the timed fault tree, the 
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decision tables are used. A “does not matter” table entry is not included in the fault tree 
since it does not affect the occurrence of events.  
 
The implemented timed fault tree is composed of several parts, as shown in the figures 
below. Based on Table 3.32, the condition „flow measurement is above 40 cm
3
/s (FM = 
2)‟ occurs if any of the following conditions is met: 
{{FSS = 1} AND {F = 2}}, 
{FSS = 2}, or 
{{FSS = 3} AND {FMP = 1}}. 
Part 1 of the fault tree for the top event is shown in Figure 3.16. Based on Table 3.33, the 
flow is above 40 cm
3
/s (F = 2) if the following condition is met:  











Figure 3.16 Timed Fault Tree Part 1 
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Figure 3.17 shows the partial fault tree for the event „FV = 2‟. Based on Table 3.31, the 
event occurs if any of the following conditions is met:  
{FVS = 0}, 
{{FVS = 1} AND {DFV = 0} AND {FVP = 1}}, 
{{{FVS = 3} AND {{FVP = 2}}, or 








FVS = 1 FVP = 1DFV = 0









Based on Table 3.35, the event „DFV = 0‟ occurs if any of the following conditions is 
met: 
{{CN = 0} AND {DFV
--
 = 0}}, or 
{{CN = 1} AND {CI = 0}}. 
 
The event „DFV = 1‟ occurs if: 
{{CN = 0} AND {DFV
--
 = 1}}, or 
{{CN = 1} AND {CI = 1}}. 
 
The corresponding partial fault trees are shown in Figures 3.18 and 3.19, respectively. 
The remaining parts of the fault tree can be derived by following a similar technique. The 
fault tree is considered complete once basic events are reached for all branches, such as 
FVS = 0 in Figure 3.17. The time dependency shown in Figures 3.18 and 3.19 is useful 
for observing the time for the occurrence of the combination of events.  
 
3
CN = 0 DFV- = 1 CN = 1 CI = 1
765
_____________________________________________________________________________
time = t – τ1
 
 




CN = 0 DFV- = 2 CN = 1 CI = 2
765
_____________________________________________________________________________
time = t – τ1
 
 
Figure 3.19 Timed Fault Tree Part 4 
 
In conclusion, the dynamic flowgraph methodology can be used to evaluate the 
performance of physically existing systems and potential systems design. In evaluating 
physically existing systems, the dynamic flowgraph methodology can be used to model 
the behaviour of the system. By selecting an event of interest, the combination of events 
or conditions that lead to the top event can be determined using deductive analysis. This 
can be accomplished by generating the timed prime implicants for the DFM model using 
the DFM Software Toolset. Also, a timed fault tree can be constructed manually to 
provide a visual representation of the combination of basic events that lead to the top 
event. Knowledge of the combination of events is useful in determining the components 
with major contribution to systems reliability. This can assist in determining maintenance 
strategy and inspection frequency.  
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In evaluating the design of systems prior to their implementation, similar analysis can be 
performed as explained above (derivation of timed prime implicants and timed fault 
trees) to determine the combination of events that lead to the top event of interest. 
Reliability data of basic events can be used to determine the reliability of the event of 
interest. This can demonstrate whether the system meets the reliability requirements. In 
addition, it can be used to study the use of various components to determine the most 
potential candidate. This provides the capability of selecting components that will meet 
the reliability requirements in order to minimize systems risk.  
 
The dynamic flowgraph methodology can also be used to predict systems‟ behaviour 
using inductive analysis. This can be performed by selecting a basic event and 
investigating the consequences of its occurrence. This helps in identifying the areas that 
should receive careful attention in their components selection and maintenance strategies 
determination.   
 
The methodology is found to meet the requirement given in Section 2.2.5.2 for 
establishing a modelling framework for the reliability of networked control systems. The 
modelling methodology captured the behaviour and interaction of the three components 
of a NCS (i.e., hardware, software and communication systems). The methodology can 
be applied to model any process and any type of communication network protocol by 
specifying the states of the basic events. In addition to the availability of systems, their 
degradation in performance was included in the model. The model incorporated time 
dependency and multi-state representation. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the modelling of the behaviour and reliability of communication networks 
in networked control system applications was presented using the dynamic flowgraph 
methodology. Also, the applicability of the method to model networked control systems 
was demonstrated. A networked control system example was specified and analyzed. The 

















APPLICATION OF DFM TO COPPER-CHLROINE THERMOCHEMICAL 
CYCLE 
 
In this chapter, the application of DFM to the copper-chlorine thermochemical cycle is 
demonstrated. An overview of nuclear-based hydrogen production methods is given 
while focusing on the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle. 
 
4.1 Introduction to Nuclear-Based Hydrogen Production 
As the demand for hydrogen usage increases, methods for its large-scale production must 
be available. Nuclear energy can become a primary energy source for hydrogen 
production plants. Yildiz & Kazimi (2006) presented various possibilities to produce 
hydrogen using Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Those are:  
1. The use of the generated electricity for liquid water electrolysis. 
2. The use of both the generated high temperature heat and the electricity for high 
temperature steam electrolysis. 
3. The use of the generated heat for thermochemical water splitting processes.  
 
Although water electrolysis is a commercially proven technology, it is an expensive 
method for centralized hydrogen production due to its low energy efficiency. On the 
other hand, in thermal processes, a series of thermally assisted chemical reactions occur 
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to release hydrogen from hydrocarbons or water. Some of the promising options include 
Steam Methane Reforming (SMR), Sulfur-Iodine (S-I), Calcium-Bromine-Iron (UT-3) 
and Copper-Chlorine (Cu-Cl) thermochemical cycles. In SMR, hydrogen is produced 
from hydrocarbons. Although it is the most economical and widespread hydrogen 
production method, it is not favourable for a long-term hydrogen economy due to its 
associated emissions of carbon dioxide (Yildiz & Kazimi, 2006). The S-I and UT-3 
thermochemical cycles were found to have the highest commercialization potential and 
practical applicability to nuclear heat sources. However, some endothermic reactions are 
necessary to occur at very high temperatures in both S-I (830 – 900 ˚C) and UT-3 (730 
˚C) cycles (Yildiz & Kazimi, 2006). The Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle is emerging as 
another promising method for large-scale hydrogen production for its offering of many 
advantages over other types of thermochemical water splitting processes. 
 
4.2 The Copper-Chlorine Thermochemical Cycle 
A collaborative effort has taken place by Argonne National Laboratories, Atomic Energy 
of Canada Limited, University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) and other 
partners to design the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle for hydrogen production. In the Cu-Cl 
cycle, water is decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen through intermediate copper and 
chlorine compounds with a highest heat temperature input of 530 ˚C (Rosen, Naterer, 
Sadhankar, & Suppiah, 2006). The relatively low heat temperature input requirement 
allows the Cu-Cl cycle for future linkage with a wider range of NPP choices. This factor 
makes the Cu-Cl cycle more advantageous over other thermochemical cycles for 
hydrogen production. More specifically, the heat input at temperatures less than 530˚C 
70 
 
make the cycle suitable for coupling with Canada‟s Generation IV reactor, Super-Critical 
Water Reactor (SCWR), which is based on the proven CANDU technology (Wang, 
Naterer, & Gabriel, 2008). The cycle offers other key advantages that include reduced 
demands on materials of construction, minimal solid handling and the requirement of 
inexpensive raw material. Further, its reactions can proceed nearly to completion without 
significant side reactions and the cycle can utilize low-grade waste heat from power 
plants for several thermal processes within the cycle (Wang et al., 2008). These 
advantages demonstrate the potential of the Cu-Cl cycle to become a sustainable method 
for large-scale hydrogen production. 
 
Rosen et al. (2006) presented a conceptual layout of the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle, as 
shown in Figure 4.1. The cycle consists of five interconnected reaction vessels, or reactor 
units, with intermediate heat exchangers. Five reactions occur in the cycle according to 
those recorded in Table 4.1 where each reaction is achieved in a reactor unit. The five 
reactor units are: hydrogen reactor, electrochemical cell, spray drying unit, fluidized bed 
and oxygen reactor. 
 
Table 4.1 Reaction Steps of Copper-Chlorine Cycle (Rosen et al., 2006) 
 
Step Reaction Temperature Range 
(˚C) 
1 2Cu (s) + 2HCl (g)  2CuCl (l) + H2 (g) 430-475 
2 2CuCl (s)  2CuCl (aq)  CuCl2 (aq) + Cu (s) Ambient (electrolysis) 
3 CuCl2 (aq)  CuCl2 (s) <100 
4 2CuCl2 (s) + H2O (g)  CuO*CuCl2 (s) + 2HCl (g) 400 






Figure 4.1 Conceptual Layout of Copper-Chlorine Cycle (Rosen et al., 2006) 
 
In Step 1, copper particles and HCl gas enter a hydrogen production reactor to react and 
generate CuCl solid and H2 gas. A conceptual layout of the auxiliary equipment for this 
step is discussed in Section 4.5. Rosen et al. (2006) indicated that Step 2 of the cycle may 
be implemented by means of an electrochemical cell. The CuCl solid produced in the 
hydrogen reactor along with that from the oxygen reactor (Step 5) are used in the 
electrochemical cell reactor (Step 2) to produce aqueous CuCl2 and solid copper particles. 
The solid copper particles exiting from the electrochemical cell are then collected and 
transported by a conveyer to the hydrogen reactor. Naterer, Daggupati, Marin, Gabriel, & 
Wang (2008) mentioned that the aqueous cupric chloride, CuCl2 of the electrolysis step is 
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necessary to be dried to provide particles that are subsequently reacted to produce copper 
oxychloride, CuO*CuCl2, hydrogen chloride gas, HCl, as well as hydrogen. The aqueous 
CuCl2 dried in the flash dryer unit is used for supply of solid CuCl2 to the fluidized bed 
reactor unit (Step 4). In the fluidized bed, the solid CuCl2 and high temperature steam 
react to produce solid CuO*CuCl2 and HCl gas. The HCl gas is used in the hydrogen 
reactor unit and the solid CuO*CuCl2 is supplied to the oxygen reactor unit (Step 5) to 
produce liquid CuCl and oxygen gas. 
 
In order to apply the DFM to the modelling of the hydrogen production plant, a 
preliminary design or knowledge of the control system must be available. In the 
following subsections, the architecture and communication structure of the networked 
control system for the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle are provided. The hydrogen reactor 
unit is used as a case study to demonstrate the detailed design of the control system by 
defining the configuration of the instrumentation and control systems. 
 
4.3 Networked Control System Design for the Hydrogen Plant 
In the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle, heat input is used to decompose water into hydrogen 
and oxygen through intermediate copper and chlorine compounds. The conceptual layout 
of the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle presented in Figure 4.1 is used as the basis for the 
design of the networked control system. As previously mentioned, the cycle consists of 
five interconnected reaction steps, i.e., hydrogen reactor, electrochemical cell, spray 
drying unit, fluidized bed and oxygen reactor.  
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In order to regulate and monitor the operation of the hydrogen production plant, 
instrumentation and control systems must be deployed. The I&C systems drive the 
reactions to occur in proper sequence while maintaining safe and reliable plant operation. 
In this section, the description of a NCS design for the hydrogen production plant is 
provided.  
 
4.3.1 Architecture of the Control System 
The design of the networked and distributed control systems for the hydrogen plant is 
based on a functional distribution scheme. In the scheme, the control functions are 
divided into logical chunks assigned to different control partitions. The architecture of the 
DCS consists of one Plant Display System (PDS) and five partitions, as shown in Figure 
4.2 (Al-Dabbagh & Lu, 2009). Each partition is responsible for the control of one of the 
reactor units. The PDS allows user intervention through an HMI system. It offers the 
capability of displaying alarms and transients of the hydrogen production plant and 
allowing control room operators to specify setpoints and control commands. 
 
4.3.2 Communication Structure of the Control System 
The communication structure of the DCS proposed in Figure 4.2 has three levels: 
information network, control network and field network. Figure 4.3 presents an upper-















Figure 4.2 Architecture of Networked Control System for Cu-Cl Cycle 
 
In figure 4.3, the type of information exchanged between the partitions and the PDS is 
presented. The PDS communicates with the group controller of each partition using the 
information network through a data gateway. The data gateway supports communication 
interface between two different communication protocols. It is used to prevent fault 
propagation from information network (non-safety system) to the control network 
(safety-system) (Kim et al., 2000). TCP/IP network protocol is proposed for 




















































does not need a highly reliable communication network. The role of the PDS is to 
monitor the production of hydrogen and oxygen gases produced in reactor units 1 and 5, 
respectively. It provides the following instructions to the control partitions: 
- Plant start command 
- Plant shutdown command 
- Target hydrogen (i.e., the required amount of hydrogen production) 
 
Given the above instructions, the partitions govern the plant to meet the hydrogen 
demand. Each partition of the DCS is responsible for achieving one of the five reactions 
in Table 4.1. The group controller of each partition is responsible for executing complex 
control logic, and monitoring device controllers in the respective reactor unit. The group 
controller of Partition 1 adjusts the hydrogen production rate while sending its copper and 
HCl gas demands to the group controller of partition 2 and 4, respectively. The group 
controller of Partition 2 then communicates with the group controller of Partition 1 and 
Partition 5 to request the necessary amount of CuCl inflow. The group controller of 
Partition 4 communicates with the group controller of Partition 2 to request the necessary 
amount of CuCl2 solid. The group controller of Partition 3 requests the necessary amount 
of CuCl2 aqueous from the group controller of Partition 2. Finally, the group controller of 
Partition 5 communicates with the group controller of Partition 4 the necessary amount of 

































Partition 5  
(Oxygen Reactor) 



























The group controllers communicate with each other using a control network. Important 
characteristics which the control network possesses are high reliability, high data 
transmission speed and maintainability. In the literature, several Ethernet-based network 
protocols were proposed to satisfy the strict requirements of safety-critical systems, such 
as those used in nuclear power plants. For example, the use of a Control Network 
Interface Card (CNIC) based on the microprocessor MPC8260 with Fast Ethernet 
controller was suggested by Kim et al. (2000). A new high speed real-time network called 
Plant Instrumentation and Control Network+ (PICNET+) was recommended by Park et 
al. (2000). A network called Ethernet based Real-Time Control Network (ERCNet) 
which uses ring topology, token passing mechanism and physical media of Fast Ethernet 
was proposed by Choi (2002). The control network in the hydrogen production plant 
utilizes a Fast Ethernet based technology: Gigabit Ethernet. Gigabit Ethernet is an 
extension of original Ethernet technology with faster data transmission speed of 1 Gbps. 
It employs all specifications of original Ethernet such as the support of CSMA/CD 
(Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection) mechanism. The mechanism 
can resolve contention on the communication medium (Lian et al., 2001). For data 
transmission, a node listens to the network before transmission. If the network is busy, 
the node waits until the network is idle. Otherwise, it transmits its data packet 
immediately. If two nodes find the network idle and decide to transmit their packets 
simultaneously, the packets of the two nodes will collide and their content will be 
corrupted. Subsequently, the nodes wait a random length of time before retransmission. 




The device controllers within each partition are responsible for executing simple logic 
and control of field devices such as valves, motors, pumps, compressors, etc. Device 
controllers of one partition can communicate with each other to acquire necessary data 
for making control decisions. Within one partition, the device controllers can also 
communicate with their group controller to exchange data and instructions. Many 
commercially available fieldbus technologies such as Profibus, DeviceNet, Foundation 
Fieldbus, etc. can be used for implementing a field network. Foundation Fieldbus (FF) 
H1 (Kadri, 2006) is proposed for selection as the field network in the hydrogen plant. Its 
use can result in reduction of wiring, decrease in maintenance costs and ability of online 
addition of field device. Further, its ability to connect different devices from different 
vendors makes the network interoperable. Its data transfer rate is 31.25 Kbps and can 
form either a bus or tree topology. It uses a single twisted pair wire with a maximum 
length of 1900 m. The maximum number of field devices that one network segment can 
accommodate is 32. However, if repeaters are used, the network can accommodate up to 
240 field devices (Kadri, 2006).  
 
4.4 Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology Modelling of the Hydrogen Plant 
This section demonstrates the use of dynamic flowgraph methodology in modelling the 
dynamical and logical interactions between the reactor units in the Cu-Cl cycle. The 
model represents the relationships between the process variables of the reactors and the 
communication between reactors. Figure 4.3 is used as the basis for the modelling of the 
hydrogen production plant. The model is shown in Figure 4.4. In the model, the term Tx 
and Rx of the model nodes denote the transmission and receive of the corresponding 
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variable, respectively. The process nodes are described in Table 4.2. The boxes that 
represent the control partitions, the PDS and the communication network influence are 
expanded to contain a DFM model that emulates the behaviour of the corresponding 
system. The DFM model of each box is used to produce output variables which are used 
as inputs to the DFM models of the other boxes.  
 








The conditional edge of each transition box is connected to the communication network 
model. The model represents the effect of the communication network on the 
transmission of signals between the group controllers. This model is similar to that 
implemented in the previous chapter. The decision tables for each transition box can be 
determined when the relationships between the process variables are specified. In the 
model, it is assumed that all controllers and transmitted messages share similar 
characteristics (i.e., processors, message size, bit time, etc.). Given the complete DFM 
model with decision tables, timed prime implicant and timed fault trees can be generated 
for any event of interest in the hydrogen production plant with Cu-Cl cycle, whether 
desirable or undesirable.  
P1a Cu Production Requirement 
P1b HCl Production Requirement 
P1c H2 Production   
P2a CuCl Production  Requirement from Partition 1 
P2b CuCl Production Requirement from Partition 5 
P4 CuCl2 Solid Production Requirement 
P3 CuCl2 Aqueous Production Requirement 
P5a CuO*CuCl2 Production Requirement 
P5b Oxygen Production    







































































































































































































































































































































































4.5 A Case Study: The Hydrogen Reactor Unit (Step 1) 
In this section, the hydrogen reactor unit (Partition 1 in Figure 4.2) is used as a case 
study. The Reactor 1 Hydrogen Reactor black box shown in Figure 4.4 is expanded. In 
order to implement the DFM model, the control methodology and specifications are 
discussed.  
 
In Step 1, copper particles enter the mixing chamber in the hydrogen reactor, descend 
along an inclined bed and then melt to produce CuCl liquid at the exit. At the same time, 
HCl gas passes through the mixing chamber (shown in Figure 4.5) to react and generate 
H2(g) in a second exit stream (Rosen et al., 2006). Wang et al. (2008) presented a 
possible layout for the auxiliary equipment associated with the hydrogen reactor as 
shown in Figure 4.6. During the start up of the reaction process, HCl and copper particles 
are heated to 400 ˚C and 80 ˚C, respectively. The HCl and hydrogen mixture of gases that 
are produced from the mixing chamber are cooled to less than 60 ˚C before applying the 
alkali solution. The alkali solution absorbs the HCl gas and allows the hydrogen gas to be 
separated for storage. Wang et al. (2008) stated that the preferred alkali solution is 
sodium hydroxide since it will not produce carbon dioxide when it reacts with HCl gas. 
In the other stream, some unreacted copper particles may exit the reactor with molten 
CuCl. Therefore, a sedimentation vessel is needed to separate the copper and return it to 
the reaction chamber. The molten CuCl product is then quenched using cold water in a 








Figure 4.6 Auxiliary Equipment for the Hydrogen Reactor (Wang et al., 2008) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the input reactants to the hydrogen reactor unit are HCl gas, from 
the fluidized bed unit (Step 4), and copper particles, from the electrochemical cell (Step 
2). The products are hydrogen gas and CuCl. The hydrogen gas is stored in a hydrogen 
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storage tank and the CuCl is used in the electrochemical cell (Step 2). As shown in Figure 
4.2, the partition that governs the hydrogen reactor unit consists of one group controller, 
several device controllers and a fieldbus network. The group controller performs the 
following tasks: (i) communication with the PDS to exchange hydrogen production data 
and plant start/shutdown commands (ii) communication with the group controller of the 
electrochemical cell partition to control and monitor the copper particles inflow and CuCl 
production and outflow; (iii) communication with the group controller of the fluidized 
bed partition to control and monitor the production and inflow of HCl gas and (iv) 
communication with the device controllers of its partition to meet the production 
demands and ensure a proper and controllable operation of process equipments. Figure 






Figure 4.7 Block Diagram of Reactor 1 
 
To facilitate the implementation of the DFM model for the reactor unit, detailed design of 
the control methodology must be established. For this reason, the configuration of the 
I&C systems is discussed. The responsibility of the device controllers is to govern the 
field devices (i.e., valves, motors, pumps, compressors, heat chambers and heat 
exchanges). The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) described below is 
implemented to demonstrate the configuration of the control devices. The P&ID for the 
   Reactor 1 
H2 demand from PDS 
                 CuCl demand from reactor 2  
Cu flow from Partition 2 
HCl flow from Partition 4 
H2 production to PDS 
CuCl production and Cu demand to reactor 2 
CuCl flow to reactor 2 











hydrogen reactor unit is developed based on the layout for the auxiliary equipments in the 
unit shown in Figure 4.6. The P&ID is decomposed into three parts: hydrogen production 
reactor unit, sedimentation and quenching units and HCl absorption unit. The description 
and corresponding DFM model of each part is described. 
 
4.5.1 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram: Part 1 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the first part of the P&ID. In the figure, HCl gas enters the 
hydrogen production reactor through Line 1-1. The flow is controller initially by control 
valves V1-1 and V1-2. It is also controlled by pump and valve, P1-1 and V1-4 or P1-2 
and V1-3. Flow measurements are provided to the controllers through the use of sensors 
F1-1 to F1-10. The redundancy of actuators and sensors is included to provide a higher 
degree of reliability in order to improve the performance. The DFM model of the flow 
through Line 1-1 is demonstrated in Figure 4.9. 
 
The input to the model shown above is the HCl requirement sent from the group 
controller of the partition to controller C1B. The controller C1B can control the valve and 
pump combination and can send command to controller C1 to adjust the valve opening 
position. The output of the model is the following: HCl requirements from reactor 4 sent 
from C1 to group controller, HCl flow into hydrogen reactor unit, and measurement of 
HCl flow into hydrogen production reactor sent from C1B to group controller.  The 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-1 Flow DFM Model 
 
F1R4 Line1 flow from reactor 4 
F1 Line 1 flow  
F1MP Measurement of line 1 flow in previous cycle 
F1SS Line 1 flow measurement sensor status 
F1M Line 1 flow measurement 
F1MC Line 1 flow measurement used by controller 
C1 Controller 1 
DF1V Change in flow 1 valve position  
F1VP Line 1 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F1VS Line 1 flow valve status 
F1V Flow 1 valve position  
C3I Instruction from controller 3 
C3IC1 Instruction from controller 3 used by controller 1 
F1B Line 1 flow after heating  
F1BMP Line 1 flow measurement after heating in previous cycle 
F1BSS Line 1 flow measurement status after heating 
F1BM Line 1 flow measurement after heating 
F1BMC Line 1 flow measurement after heating used by controller 
C1B Controller 1B  
F1BVP Line 1 flow valve position after heating in previous cycle 
DF1BV Change in line 1 flow valve position after heating 
F1BVS Line 1 flow valve status after heating 
F1BV Line 1 flow valve position after heating 
F1BPP Line 1 flow pump speed in previous cycle 
DF1BP Change in line flow pump speed 
F1BPS Line 1 flow pump status 
F1BP Line 1 flow after heating in previous cycle 
DF1B Change in line 1 flow after heating 
 
Copper particles enter the hydrogen production reactor through Line 1-7. The speed of 
motor M1-2 governs the flow of the Cu particles. Flow sensors are used to measure the 
amount of Cu particles flow into the production reactor. The DFM model of this process 
is shown in Figure 4.10. The input to the model is the Cu requirement sent from group 
controller to C7. The output of the model is the Cu requirement from reactor 2 sent from 
C7 to group controller and Cu supply to hydrogen production reactor. The description of 
variables included in the model is shown in Table 4.4. 
88 
 
Table 4.4 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-7 Flow DFM Model 
 
F7 Line 7 flow  
F7R2 Cu supply from reactor 2 
F7MP Line 7 flow measurement in previous cycle 
F7SS Line 7 flow sensor status 
F7M Line 7 flow measurement  
F7MC Line 7 flow measurement used by controller 
DM2 Change in motor 2 speed 
M2P Motor 2 speed in previous cycle 
M2S Motor 2 status 
M2 Motor 2 status 
COVS Conveyor status 
DF7 Change in line 7 flow 
 
The role of heat exchanger HEX1, and heating chamber in the P&ID is to adjust the 
temperature of the Cu particles and the HCl gas to 400 ˚C and 80 ˚C, respectively, before 
entering the hydrogen production reactor. The controller of each device obtains 
temperature measurements at its inlet and outlet from temperature sensors provided along 
each stream. The DFM model of the temperature of both streams is shown in Figure 4.11. 
 
The inputs to the model are the HCl and Cu flow temperature requirement sent group 
controller to C1T and C7T, respectively. The outputs of the model are the following: HCl 
and Cu flow temperature measurement sent from C1T and C7T to group controller, 
respectively, and temperature of the HCl and Cu flow to hydrogen production reactor. 






















































































































Table 4.5 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-1 and Line 1-7 Temperature Control 
DFM Model 
 
TF1BH Temperature of line 1 flow before heating 
TF1SS Line 1 flow temperature sensor status 
TMF1 Measurement of line 1 flow temperature before heating 
TMF1C Measurement of line 1 flow temperature before heating used by controller 
C1T 
DTF1 Change in temperature of line 1 flow 
TF1P Temperature of line 1 flow in previous cycle 
HCS Heating chamber status 
TF1A Temperature of line 1 flow after heating 
TMF1A Measurement of line 1 temperature after heating 
TF1AC Measurement of line 1 flow temperature after heating used by controller 
TF1AS Line 1 flow temperature sensor status after heating 
TF7BH Temperature of line 7 flow before heating 
TF7SS Line 7 flow temperature sensor status 
TMF7 Measurement of line 7 flow temperature before heating 
TMF1C Measurement of line 7 flow temperature before heating used by controller 
DTF7 Change in temperature of line 7 flow 
TF7P Temperature of line 7 flow in previous cycle 
HEXS Heat exchanger status 
TF7A Temperature of line 7 flow after heating 
TF7AS Line 7 flow temperature sensor status after heating 
TMF7A Measurement of line 7 temperature after heating 
TF7AC Measurement of line 7 flow temperature after heating used by controller 
 
The role of the main and standby valves and pumps along 1-3 is to govern the flow of 
cooling water into the reactor, where flow sensors are placed along the stream to provide 
measurements to the controllers of the valves and pumps. The valves along Line 1-2 
control the flow from the main water stream to Line 1-3, Line 1-5 and Line 1-6. The 
DFM model of the flow through both streams is shown in Figure 4.12. The description of 

























































































































































































































Table 4.6 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-2 and Line 1-3 Flow DFM Model 
 
F2 Flow through line 2 
F3 Flow though line 3 
F3MP Measurement of line 3 flow in previous cycle 
F3SS Line 3 flow sensor status 
F3M Measurement of line 3 flow 
F3MC Measurement of line 3 flow used by controller 
DF3V Change in line 3 flow valve position 
F3VP Line 3 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F3VS Line 3 flow valve status 
F3V Line 3 flow valve position 
DF3P Change in line 3 flow pump speed 
F3PP Line 3 flow pump speed in previous cycle 
F3PS Line 3 flow pump status 
F3P Line 3 flow pump speed 
DF3 Change in line 3 flow 
F2T Line 2 flow from tank 
F2 Line 2 flow 
F2MP Line 2 flow measurement in previous cycle 
F2SS Line 2 flow sensor status 
F2M Line 2 flow measurement 
F2MC Line 2 flow measurement used by controller 
DF2V Change in line 2 flow valve position 
F2VP Line 2 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F2VS Line 2 flow valve status 
F2V Line 2 flow valve position 
 
The input to the model are the H2O requirement sent from group controller to C3 for flow 
into the hydrogen production reactor and to C2 for flow into the three water supply lines 
Line 1-3, Line 1-5 and Line 1-6. The outputs of the model are the following: 
- H2O flow into hydrogen production reactor sent from C3 to group controller 
- H2O flow requirement from line 2 sent from C3 to group controller 
- H2O flow into hydrogen production reactor 
- H2O supply to two lines 







































































































































































































The role of the device controller of the hydrogen production reactor motor M1-1 is to 
govern its speed to adjust the hydrogen production rate to meet production demand. The 
production rate calculation is based on a comparison of the hydrogen production demand, 
and the hydrogen flow rate through Line 1-21 in Part 3 of the P&ID. Once the production 
rate is determined, the device controller of the hydrogen production reactor 
communicates with the device controllers of the devices along Line 1-1, Line 1-7, and 
Line 1-3 to control the inflow of HCl gas, Cu particles, and cooling water, respectively. 
The DFM model of the hydrogen production reactor operation is shown in Figure 4.13. 
The inputs to the model are the following: instruction from group controller to C8, HCl 
flow, H2O flow, HCl temperature and Cu temperature. The outputs of the model are HCl 
and H2 outflow and CuCl and Cu outflow. The description of the variables in the DFM 
Model is shown in Table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7 Description of Process Variables of Hydrogen Production Reactor DFM Model 
 
GCC8 Instruction from group controller to controller C8 
GCC8R Instruction from group controller to controller C8 received 
DM1 Change in motor M1-1 speed 
M1P Motor M1-1 speed in previous cycle 
M1S Motor M1-1 status 
M1 Motor M1-1 speed 
F13 Line 13 flow 
























































































































4.5.2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram: Part 2 
The second part of the P&ID shown in Figure 4.14 demonstrates how the produced 
molten CuCl is fed to the sedimentation and quenching units.  In the figure, molten CuCl 
is transported after sedimentation to the quenching cell through Line 1-17. The pumps 
and valves along Line 1-17 control the amount of CuCl molten flow into the cell. The 
DFM model of the flow through the stream is shown in Figure 4.15. The inputs to the 
model are the CuCl and Cu flow and CuCl requirement sent from group controller to 
C17. The outputs of the model are the CuCl solid flow and measurement sent from C7 to 
group controller. The description of the variables in the DFM model is shown in Table 
4.8. 
 
Table 4.8 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-17 Flow DFM Model 
 
F17B Flow through line 17 from sedimentation cell 
F17 Flow through line 17 after pumps and valves 
F17MP Measurement of line 17 flow in previous cycle 
F17SS Line 17 flow sensor status 
F17M Measurement of line 17 flow 
F17MC Measurement of line 17 flow used by controller 
DF17V Change in line 17 flow valve position 
F17VP Line 17 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F17VS Line 17 flow valve status 
F17V Line 17 flow valve position 
DF17P Change in line 17 flow pump speed 
F17PP Line 17 flow pump speed in previous cycle 
F17PS Line 17 flow pump status 
F17P Line 17 flow pump speed 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Figure 4.14, the device controller of the quenching cell communicates with the 
controllers of V1-13 in Line 1-18 and V1-14 in Line 1-19 to adjust the rate of liquid 
water inflow and water vapour outflow where flow sensors are provided for each stream. 
The DFM model of both streams is shown in Figure 4.16. The inputs to the model are the 
following: water vapour from quenching cell, valve position instruction sent from group 
controller to C18, water supply to supply unit E, and valve position instruction sent from 
group controller to C19. The outputs of the model are the following: water vapour 
measurement sent from C18 to group controller, water vapour leaving quenching cell, 
water measurement send from C19 to group controller, and water entering quenching 
cell. The description of the variables in the DFM model is shown in Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-18 and Line 1-19 Flow DFM Model 
 
F18QC Flow through line 18 coming from quenching cell 
F18 Flow though line 18 after the valve 
F18MP Measurement of flow through line 18 in previous cycle 
F18SS Line 18 flow sensor status 
F18M Measurement of flow through line 18 
F18MC Measurement of flow through line 18 used by controller 
DF18V Change in line 18 valve opening 
F18VP Line 18 valve position in previous cycle 
F18V Line 18 valve position 
F18VS Line 18 valve status 
F19E Flow through line 19 coming from E 
F19 Flow though line 19 after the valve 
F19MP Measurement of flow through line 19 in previous cycle 
F19SS Line 19 flow sensor status 
F19M Measurement of flow through line 19 
F19MC Measurement of flow through line 19 used by controller 
DF19V Change in line 19 valve opening 
F19VP Line 19 valve position in previous cycle 
F19V Line 19 valve position 



















































































































































































































The group controller communicates with the device controller of the quenching cell to 
exchange data and setpoints with regard to solid CuCl production. The DFM model of the 
quenching operation is shown in Figure 4.17. The inputs to the model are the water and 
CuCl molten entering the quenching cell and the water vapour leaving the quenching cell. 
The outputs of the model are the CuCl solid exiting the quenching cell and the 
measurement sent to group controller, and the quenching cell pressure measurement sent 
to group controller. The description of the variables of the DFM model is shown in Table 
4.10.  
 
Table 4.10 Description of Process Variables of Quenching Cell DFM Model 
 
CuCl CuCl production 
CuCl_P Measurement of CuCl in previous cycle 
MSS CuCl production sensor status 
CuCl Measurement of CuCl production 
CuClC Measurement of CuCl production sent to group controller 
QCP Quenching cell pressure 
QCPP Quenching cell pressure measurement in previous cycle 
QCSS Quenching cell pressure sensor status 
QCPM Quenching cell pressure measurement 
QCPC Quenching cell pressure measurement sent to group controller 





















































































































4.5.3 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram: Part 3 
The third part of the P&ID shown in Figure 4.18 demonstrates how the produced HCl and 
H2 gases are cooled and separated. In the figure, the device controller of the cooling 
chamber communicates with the controllers of the valves located in Line 1-12 to control 
the HCl and H2 gases that flow into the chamber. Temperature measurements provided by 
sensors T1-7 and T1-8 are used by the device controller to cool the temperature of the 
gases down below 60 ˚C prior to entering the HCl absorption tank as specified in (Wang 
et al., 2008). The device controller also communicates with the controllers of the 
instruments in Line 1-6 to control the flow of cooling water into the chamber. The device 
controller of the HCl absorption tank communicates with the controllers of the devices 
along Line 1-20 to control the inflow of the alkali solution into the absorption tank. It 
also communicates with the device controllers along Line 1-21 to control the flow of 
hydrogen gas into the hydrogen storage tank. Flow sensors are used along both streams to 
provide the device controller with alkali solution and hydrogen gas flow rates. 
 
The DFM model of Line 1-12 temperature and Line 1-6 flow is shown in Figure 4.19. 
The inputs to the model are the water supply through Line 1-6 and the temperature 
requirement sent from group control to CCC. The outputs of the model are the 
temperature measurement sent from CCC to group controller, H2O requirement from 
Line 1-6 sent from C6 to group controller and temperature of HCl and H2 gases. The 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.11 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-12 Temperature and Line 1-6 Flow 
DFM Model 
 
TF12B Temperature of line 12 flow before cooling 
TF12SS Line 12 flow temperature sensor status 
TMF12 Measurement of line 12 flow temperature before cooling 
TF1C Measurement of line 12 flow temperature before cooling used by 
controller 
DTF12 Change in temperature of line 12 flow 
TF12P Temperature of line 12 flow in previous cycle 
CCS Cooling chamber status 
TF12A Temperature of line 12 flow after cooling 
TF12A Measurement of line 12 temperature after cooling 
TF12A Measurement of line 12 flow temperature after cooling used by 
controller 
TF12AS Line 12 flow temperature sensor status after cooling 
F6 Flow though line 6 
F6MP Measurement of line 6 flow in previous cycle 
F6SS Line 6 flow sensor status 
F6M Measurement of line 6 flow 
F6MC Measurement of line 6 flow used by controller 
DF6V Change in line 6 flow valve position 
F6VP Line 6 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F6VS Line 6 flow valve status 
F6V Line 6 flow valve position 
DF6P Change in line 6 flow pump speed 
F6PP Line 6 flow pump speed in previous cycle 
F6PS Line 6 flow pump status 
F6P Line 6 flow pump speed 
DF6 Change in line 6 flow 
CCI Cooling chamber instruction 
CCIC6 Cooling chamber instruction used by controller 6 
 
The DFM model of the flow through Line 1-12 and Line 1-20 is shown in Figure 4.20. 
The inputs to the model are the following: HCl and H2 production from hydrogen 
production reactor, HCl and H2 temperature after cooling, HCl and H2 flow to separation 
tank sent from group controller to C12 and Alkali flow to separation tank sent from group 
controller to C20. The outputs of the model are the following: HCl and H2 production 
measurement sent from C12 to group controller, HCl and H2 flow measurement sent from 
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C12 to group controller, Alkali flow measurement sent from C20 to group controller, 
Hydrogen flow through line 21 and hydrogen flow through line 21 measurement sent to 
group controller. The description of the variables in the DFM model is shown in Table 
4.12.  
 
Table 4.12 Description of Process Variables of Line 1-12 and Line 1-20 Flow DFM 
Model 
 
F12 Line 12 flow 
F12MP Line 12 flow measurement in previous cycle 
F12SS Line 12 flow sensor status 
F12M Line 12 flow measurement 
F12MC Line 12 flow measurement used by controller 
DF12V Change in line 12 flow valve position 
F12VP Line 12 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F12VS Line 12 flow valve status 
F12V Line 12 flow valve position 
F20AT Flow through line 20 from alkali storage tank 
F20 Flow though line 20 
F20MP Measurement of line 20 flow in previous cycle 
F20SS Line 20 flow sensor status 
F20M Measurement of line 20 flow 
F20MC Measurement of line 20 flow used by controller 
DF20V Change in line 20 flow valve position 
F20VP Line 20 flow valve position in previous cycle 
F20VS Line 20 flow valve status 
F20V Line 20 flow valve position 
DF20P Change in line 20 flow pump speed 
F20PP Line 20 flow pump speed in previous cycle 
F20PS Line 20 flow pump status 
F20P Line 20 flow pump speed 
DF20 Change in line 20 flow 
F21ST Line 21 flow from separation tank 
F21SS Line 21 flow sensor status 
F21M Line 21 flow measurement 






























































































































































































































































The DFM model for the Cu-Cl cycle is considered complete when knowledge of the 
components and behaviour of the process is clearly defined. As research continues to 
design and develop the cycle, complete process design and behaviour, components 
selection, and control logic and flow should be specified in order to complete the DFM 
model in future research. The completion of the model will allow deductive and inductive 
analysis to be performed.    
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a review of the conceptual design of a nuclear-based thermochemical 
copper-chlorine cycle was provided. The design of the networked control system for the 
cycle was addressed. The architecture and the communication structure of the control 
system were discussed. The dynamic flowgraph methodology was applied to model the 
Cu-Cl cycle, where the hydrogen reactor unit was used as a case study. The configuration 
of the instrumentation and control systems for the reactor unit was presented using a 












CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
This thesis investigates the reliability modelling of networked control systems, where 
control elements (i.e., controllers, sensors and actuators) are connected by a shared 
communication network. It is shown that the dynamic flowgraph methodology can be 
extended to model the behaviour and effect of communication network in networked 
control systems applications. Timed prime implicants and timed fault trees can be 
generated to analyze the model and to identify areas of improvement. The former was 
applied to study the communication network model and the latter was used to study the 
networked control system model. This thesis also presents the design of a networked and 
distributed control system for a nuclear-based hydrogen production plant with copper-
chlorine thermochemical cycle. The control architecture and communication structure are 
defined. It is also demonstrated how the dynamic flowgraph methodology can be applied 
to model the Cu-Cl cycle. The hydrogen reactor unit of the cycle is used as a case study 
to present the detailed modelling steps.  
 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
It is recommended that future research should investigate the computational capability 
and scalability of the DFM Software Toolkit as well as its performance when 
implementing DFM models of complex systems and processes. Future research is also 
recommended to provide a complete and controlled hydrogen production process by 
111 
 
having detailed specifications of instrumentation and control systems. This includes the 
selection and configuration of I&C systems for the 5 units of the cycle. The availability 
of a complete process design and specifications allows the finding of reliability data of 
basic components of the system. This assists in performing detailed reliability analysis. 
For example, reliability data of basic components can be used in the timed fault trees to 
measure reliability and occurrence of events of interest. In addition, the control logic and 
control flow need to be assigned upon completion of process design. This can provide the 
capability of maintaining an appropriately functioning and controlled system in order to 
maximize plant‟s life and minimize risk and plant‟s failure.   
 
A detailed DFM model to emulate both the behaviour of the plant and the effect of the 
control system need to be constructed. The model construction will become possible 
when detailed specifications of the controlled process and I&C systems are available. The 
detailed model can be used to study the functionality of the system and measure the 
reliability of the plant. It can be used to predict the occurrence of events and identify the 
corresponding consequences. A physical prototype of the controlled process and 
associated control system should be implemented. This can assist in performing 
experiments to obtain real-time results and observe system‟s behaviour. It allows the 
establishment of a reference for comparison with the DFM model implemented for the 
plant. Also, the knowledge of system behaviour can be used in creating a DFM model 
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%%This MATLAB code is used to calculate the total network delay  
%produced in a NCS example. 
%%BY: AHMAD W. AL-DABBAGH 
  
  
%% Variables initialization 
  
% preprocessing time at the source node when processor is unavailable -  
% in microseconds 
Tau_x = 10000000;                                        
% status of source node hardware and software  
SHSS = 0;                                            
% preprocessing time at source node when processor is available - in 
% microseconds 
Tau_pre = 1;                                          
% postprocessing time at destination node when processor is unavailable  
% - in microseconds 
Tau_y = 10000000;                                         
% status of destination node hardware and software 
DHSS = 0;                                             
% postprocessing time at destination node when processor is available -  
% in microseconds 
Tau_post = 1;                                         
% message size - in bits 
ms = 240;                                             
% bit time - in microseconds 
Tau_bit = 0.2;                                        
% network delay when communication network is unavailable - in  
% microseconds 
Tau_k = 10000000;                                         
% availability of communication network link 
NTA = 0;                                              
% waiting time at the source node - in milliseconds 
Tau_wait = rand(1)*2000;                             
  
  
%% Device delay calculations 
  
if (SHSS == 0) 
    pre = Tau_pre; 
else 





if (DHSS == 0) 
    post = Tau_post; 
else 
    post = Tau_y; 
end 
  
% device delay  
device_delay = pre + post;                             
     
%% Network delay calculations 
  
% transmission delay 
Tau_trans = ms*Tau_bit;                                
  
if (Tau_wait >1200) 
    Tau_wait = 1200; 
else 
    Tau_wait = Tau_wait; 
end 
  
Tau_wait = Tau_wait*1000; 
network_del = Tau_wait + Tau_trans; 
  
if (NTA == 0) 
    network_delay = network_del; 
else 





%% Total delay calculation 
  
% total time delay - in seconds 
total_delay = (device_delay + network_delay)/1000000      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
